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A BIRD IN THE HAND: SHOTGUNS, DEADLY OIL PITS, CUTE 
KITTENS, AND THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
Samuel J. Panarella* 
The defining characteristic shared by all migratory birds is found in 
the category name—migration.1 More than half of the 650 species of 
North American breeding birds migrate.2 Similar to migrations 
undertaken by other animals—including humans—bird migrations are 
often fraught with peril, and depending on the species of migratory bird 
can be hundreds or even thousands of miles long and take weeks or 
months to complete.3 Fortunately, most migrating birds make the journey 
safely. Those lucky ducks (and other birds) are not the subject of this 
Article. Rather, the focus here will be on the unfortunate birds that never 
arrive at their intended migratory destination, as well as those killed 
between migrations. Specifically, this Article will explore the question of 
what, if any, legal consequences should attach under the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (the “MBTA” or the “Act”)4 when a bird protected under the 
Act is killed, intentionally or unintentionally, by anthropogenic activities. 
More than just an interesting historical artifact, the original motivation 
behind the passage of the MBTA—to protect migratory birds from 
anthropogenic harm—is relevant today. Courts struggle to define what 
limits, if any, should be placed on its application to activities that, unlike 
hunting and poaching, are in no part motivated by intent to kill or injure 
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1 Animal migration is defined as “mov[ing] from one area to another at different times of the 
year.” Migrate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/migrate. 
2 See The Basics Of Bird Migration: How, Why, And Where, THE CORNELL LAB OF 
ORNITHOLOGY (Jan. 1, 2007), https://www.allaboutbirds.org/the-basics-how-why-and-where-of-
bird-migration/. 
3 The dangers attendant in migrations are particularly and heartbreakingly relevant at the time 
of this writing as many thousands of refugees from the Syrian civil war have died trying to flee to 
safer places. See, e.g., Jim Yardley & Gaia Pianigiani, Three Days, 700 Deaths on Mediterranean 
as Migrant Crisis Flares, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
05/30/world/europe/migrants-deaths-mediterranean-libya-italy.html (recounting how at least 700 
refugees trying to reach Europe from Syria and parts of Africa drowned in three separate shipwrecks 
over three days). 
4 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)). The MBTA is the oldest U.S. federal law protecting birds. See 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, DIGEST OF FEDERAL RESOURCE LAWS OF INTEREST TO THE 
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
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migratory birds but nevertheless do. The MBTA is administered by the 
U.S. Department of Interior (“Department of Interior”) through the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”).5 The Act’s encompassing 
“take” language and facial strict liability standard appear to reflect a 
strong congressional intent to offer protection to listed birds from 
multifarious causes and actors, without special regard to the societal or 
commercial utility of the underlying activity. Add to that Congress’s 
refusal over the last one hundred years to alter the Act’s broad 
misdemeanor strict liability reach, even as it limited felony liability by 
requiring scienter, and an otherwise sober-minded person could be 
forgiven for concluding that the most legally prudent course of action is 
to never leave home lest she accidentally injure a bird in her travels and 
face criminal sanctions under the MBTA. Fortunately, common sense, 
compelling legislative history, case law, and a history of the judicious 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion all argue against this extreme reaction 
to the Act. But it would be equal folly to assume that as long as one does 
not engage in the hunting or poaching of birds there is nothing to fear 
from the MBTA. Put another way, it is equally incorrect to say that the 
MBTA only applies to hunting and poaching activities as it is to say the 
Act applies to every anthropogenic harm that could befall a bird. The 
former is too limited a view and misses the more generalized 
conservational intent behind the Act. The latter is so broad that, if applied, 
it would criminalize many otherwise lawful and societally and 
economically-necessary commercial uses of the land, such as farming and 
construction, as well as many nonindustrial but no less valued activities, 
such as driving a car or sharing one’s house and yard with a pet cat—a 
result Congress simply could not have intended when it passed the Act. 
Where then is the Goldilocks-ian middle of MBTA liability that does 
not criminalize every activity that might result in harm to a bird, but also 
imposes legal consequences for anthropogenic harms to bird species of 
the kind that motivated Congress to pass the Act? This question has 
bedeviled federal courts in the United States and is the subject of a 
longstanding and intense dispute between bird advocacy groups and 
businesses whose industrial activities regularly, albeit incidentally, kill 
migratory birds. And, this question recently made headlines across the 
country again when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in 
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,6 reversed Citgo’s MBTA 
criminal misdemeanor conviction for migratory bird deaths caused by 
birds landing in oil and wastewater pits at a refinery the company operates 
in Texas. The district court found that Citgo’s oil field operations were a 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
5 16 U.S.C. § 701. 
6 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Citgo Petroleum”). 
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proximate cause of the bird deaths because these deaths were a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of Citgo using open-air oil and wastewater pits, 
and, therefore, that Citgo was criminally liable for a “take” under the 
MBTA.7 In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that criminal 
liability for a taking under the MBTA is limited to situations where the 
alleged violator took actions directed at migratory birds, which Citgo, 
simply by operating the pits in furtherance of its refining operations, had 
not done.8 
The Fifth Circuit’s Citgo Petroleum opinion widened an existing split 
among United States federal circuit courts on the question of whether 
criminal liability under the MBTA should extend beyond affirmative acts 
directed against migratory birds (e.g., hunting and poaching) to reach acts 
that are not directed at birds but nevertheless result in the death of a 
protected bird.9 It is well established under the law that activities in the 
former category violate the MBTA and subject the actor to criminal 
liability under the Act.10 The question that remains unresolved is whether 
incidental bird deaths caused by the remarkably wide range of activities 
making up the latter category (from industrial activities such as utilizing 
open-air oil and wastewater pits in oil and gas operations and operating 
electricity production facilities to typically nonindustrial activities such 
as driving a car, letting a housecat roam freely outside, and living in a 
dwelling with windows) should result in criminal liability under the Act. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
7 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801 
F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015). The same year a federal district court in North Dakota, faced with 
strikingly similar facts, came to the opposite conclusion, holding that no criminal liability should 
attach under the MBTA for bird deaths caused by landing in defendant oil and gas producer’s 
wastewater reserve pits, because the defendant’s use of the reserve pits was not intended to kill 
birds. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212–13 (D.N.D. 2012) 
(“[T]he use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity 
that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”). 
8 Citgo Petroleum, 801 F.3d at 494. 
9 See 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2012). Section 707(a), the misdemeanor penalty provision of the MBTA, 
provides for punishment of up to a $15,000 fine and/or up to six months in prison for any violation 
of the Act. The MBTA’s felony penalty provision, § 707(b), concerns knowingly taking a listed 
migratory bird for the purpose of selling it. Because this Article does not address collecting and 
selling migratory birds, § 707(a)’s misdemeanor liability will be the focus of this article’s liability 
discussion. 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002) (hunter who exceeded 
his daily bag limit of ducks violated the MBTA); Rice Farmer Convicted and Fined for Poisoning 
Birds, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, S. DIST. OF TEX. (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/rice-farmer-convicted-and-fined-poisoning-birds (rice 
farmer pleads guilty to MBTA criminal violation for intentionally poisoning 69 protected birds to 
keep them from eating his crop); Parma Farmer Convicted of Conspiracy to Bait Ducks and 
Placing Bait for Ducks, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF IDAHO (May 17, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-id/pr/parma-farmer-convicted-conspiracy-bait-ducks-and-
placing-bait-ducks (farmer convicted under MBTA for baiting farm to allow hunters to shoot 
migratory birds attracted by bait). 
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This article traces the often byzantine reasoning underlying this circuit 
split and offers a practical solution to resolve it by using a category-based 
approach to criminal liability under the MBTA. 
This Article is presented in three parts. Part I describes the modern 
application (and misapplication) of the MBTA and briefly sets out the 
history of the Act, including the widespread, indiscriminate killing of 
migratory birds for food and fashion in the 19th century that first spurred 
Congress to act. Building off this history and the clear Congressional 
intent behind the MBTA to criminalize industrial activities directed at 
killing birds, Part II sorts human-caused bird killing activities into three 
categories and proposes the appropriate MBTA liability treatment for 
each category based both on the original purpose of the Act and on our 
modern understanding of the desirability of balancing critical animal 
species preservation against necessary industrial activity. This Article 
concludes in Part III with a summary of the proposed approaches to the 
current MBTA liability quagmire. 
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When you have shot one bird flying you have shot all birds flying. 
They are all different and they fly in different ways but the 
sensation is the same and the last one is as good as the first.11 
I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
A. A Law out of Time? 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),12 the United States’ 
best known, oft-copied, and most heavily litigated animal-protection law, 
has entered a comfortable, albeit still controversial, middle age. The 
ESA’s animating purpose (“to protect and recover threatened and 
endangered species and the ecosystems upon which they depend”)13 and 
strictures, while certainly not universally admired by all, are nevertheless 
relatively well understood by its regulated community. Principal among 
these strictures is that the incidental taking14 of an ESA listed species 
without an Incidental Take Permit violates the ESA and subjects the 
“takee” to potential civil and criminal liability.15 Compare the MBTA, a 
far older animal protection law, that even in its dotage at one hundred 
years old, remains subject to significant controversy about when and to 
what actions it should apply. At first blush, a plain reading of the MBTA 
and its implementing regulations appear to provide the same clarity 
offered by ESA’s take provision—the taking of a listed migratory bird 
for any reason and regardless of intention results in potential criminal 
liability.16 And for intended takes, such as a hunter intentionally shooting 
a protected migratory bird out of season, the application of the statute is 
as straightforward as its wording.17 It is where the take of a protected bird 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
11 ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO AND OTHER STORIES 63 (1961). 
12 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. § 136 (2000) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000)). 
13 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
14 Similar to the take definition under the MBTA, a “take” occurs under the ESA when a listed 
species is harassed, harmed, pursued, hunted, shot, killed, wounded, trapped, captured or collected, 
or by any attempt to engage in such conduct. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
15 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Unlike the ESA, the MBTA does not in most circumstances allow a 
party with foreknowledge that its activities may incidentally result in the take of a covered species 
to apply for an Incidental Take Permit to obviate liability for the incidental take under the Act. The 
Service may issue take permits under the MBTA for certain intentional activities that result in the 
death of a protected bird, such as scientific collecting, educational purposes, taxidermy and 
falconry. See U.S FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 724 FW 1, AUTHORITIES, OBJECTIVES, AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MIGRATORY BIRD PERMITS (2003). 
16 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). 
17 See, e.g., Hunting Guides Sentenced for Violating Migratory Bird Act in Reno County, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF KAN. (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/hunting-guides-sentenced-violating-migratory-bird-act-reno-
county (announcing the sentencing of two Kansas hunting guides for violating the MBTA by 
exceeding the daily bag limits of Canada geese and mourning doves). 
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was not intended, but rather the incidental result of an otherwise lawful 
activity that the formerly clear waters become muddy, verging on opaque. 
Despite being one of the oldest U.S. laws protecting wildlife, the 
MBTA remains relatively obscure. Outside of a small community of bird 
advocacy groups, hunters, owners of industrial operations that threaten 
migratory birds—and, yes, some lawyers and law professors—the Act’s 
primary prohibition against the intended killing of migratory birds has 
little purchase on the popular imagination. In fact, beyond this small 
community, to the extent the MBTA is known at all, it is for criminalizing 
acts that almost certainly were not the intended target by the Act’s 
original drafters. To wit, if you ask random people on the street what they 
know about the MBTA, eventually you would likely find someone who 
is aware of the law, and that person’s response would likely be something 
along the lines of, “Isn’t that the law that makes it a federal crime for your 
cat to kill a bird?” If you asked this same hypothetical well-informed 
person what she knows about the ESA, a federal law with a strong 
foothold in the popular imagination, she would likely tell you that it is the 
federal law that makes it a crime to harm or kill endangered species 
without a permit. Both of these responses are factually correct (if 
incomplete), but only the Endangered Species Act response describes a 
prohibition that was fundamental to the original purpose of the Act when 
it was passed, and remains foundational today. The MBTA response, on 
the other hand, describes a technical violation that even the original 
drafters of the Act would likely have disagreed with and that has little to 
no relevance to how the MBTA is enforced on the ground today. 
The Endangered Species Act became law in 1973 as part of a tidal 
wave of federal environmental and animal welfare legislation passed in 
response to the burgeoning environmental movement of the early 1970s.18 
Much has changed in the country in the intervening forty years since its 
passage and the ESA has been amended several times in response, which 
has kept it a thoroughly modern law.19 Compare the MBTA, which came 
into existence at a time in America when our current conceptions about 
the need to balance peoples’ desires for the nutritional bounty and 
sartorial possibilities available from harvesting wild animals with the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
18 Other major environmental legislation passed by Congress during this period includes the 
National Environmental Policy Act in 1970 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–370h), the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”) in 1972 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387), and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 6901–992k). 
19 For example, the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act authorized the Service to 
issue permits for the “incidental take” of listed species from otherwise legal activities and 
introduced the requirement that applicants for incidental take permits prepare Habitat Conservation 
Plans that minimize and mitigate harm to the impacted species during the proposed project. 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). 
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value (both psychic and tangible) of preserving these animals at 
sustainable populations were just beginning to take shape. Indeed many 
of the primary threats to birds in the 21st century were unknown in 1918 
when the Act came into being. For instance, today communication towers 
are responsible for several million bird deaths every year and many 
thousands of birds die annually from colliding with commercial wind 
turbines, but neither of these man-made structures existed in 1918.20 Like 
the ESA, the MBTA has been amended several times over its lifetime, 
but unlike the amendments to the ESA, these amendments have done little 
to clarify the MBTA’s reach or applicability in the modern world, making 
it “a law out of time.” 
B. Impetus for the Act 
At the close of the 19th century, America was an industrialized country 
whose citizens seemed determined to bring under their dominion every 
square inch of the nation’s remaining wild lands, and to put into their 
stomachs or onto their bodies the wild animals that lived on those lands. 
The United States was settled from coast-to-coast, with a transcontinental 
railroad that made it possible to traverse the country at speeds 
unimaginable only a few decades earlier, and held an exalted status as the 
world’s manufacturing powerhouse.21 Oil wells were being sunk at a 
furious pace in newly-discovered oil fields in several states, and John D. 
Rockefeller’s now-infamous monopolistic monolith, Standard Oil, 
controlled 90 percent of the oil refined in the United States.22 The United 
States entered the new millennium with a booming economy, a 
conviction bordering on arrogance in its own exceptionalism, and a future 
that appeared unimaginably bright. 
Of course, there was another, much darker, side to this triumphant 
narrative. The U.S. Calvary’s massacre of hundreds of members of the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
20 See Andrew W. Minikowski, A Vision or a Waking Dream: Revising the Migratory Bird Act 
to Empower Citizens and Address Modern Threats to Avian Populations, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 152, 
156–57 (2014) (“The modern threats facing migratory bird species could not have possibly been 
contemplated by Congress when MBTA was passed in 1918, due to the extreme advances in 
technological and industrial development that have since occurred. The statute needs to be 
reexamined in the context of these modern threats in order to prevent it from becoming a mere 
nullity or legislative antique.”). 
21 See GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 299 
(11th ed. 2010) (“American gains in manufacturing output were . . . phenomenal relative to the rest 
of the world. In the mid-1890s, the United States became the leading industrial power, and by 1910, 
its factories poured forth goods of nearly twice the value of those of its nearest rival, Germany. In 
1913, the United States accounted for more than one-third of the world’s industrial production.”). 
22 See Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Monopoly, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND., 
http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-16-2-b-rockefeller-and-the-standard-oil-
monopoly.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
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Lakota Sioux tribe on the banks of Wounded Knee Creek in South Dakota 
effectively ended the co-called Indian Wars that had raged across the 
country for the better part of the 18th and 19th centuries.23 By 1900, the 
Native American tribes that had survived the disease and brutalities 
visited on them during these battles had been shunted off to live on newly-
created reservations, most of which were located in some of the country’s 
most inhospitable and least fecund lands.24 
Many of the animals that the Indian tribes had once relied on for their 
survival fared no better. By the turn of the century, the American bison 
was on the brink of extinction.25 This is remarkable considering that in 
1860, only four decades earlier, the bison’s overwhelming presence on 
America’s Great Plains caused one observer to note: “What strikes the 
stranger with most amazement is their immense numbers. I know a 
million is a great many, but I am confident we saw that number yesterday. 
Certainly, all we saw could not have stood on ten square miles of ground. 
Often, the country for miles on either hand seemed quite black with 
them.”26 By the 1870s, commercial bison hunters were slaughtering the 
animals at a remarkable rate, sending hundreds of thousands of bison 
hides to the markets in the eastern United States each year.27 During the 
1872–1873 commercial hunting season alone, over 1.5 million bison 
hides were sent to market.28 The killing wasn’t limited to the commercial 
hunters. Passengers on the new transcontinental railroads were 
encouraged to shoot bison from the windows of their coaches, leaving the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
23 See ROBERT M. UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, INDIAN WARS 300 (2002) (asserting that 
the massacre at Wounded Knee “rang down the curtain” on the Indian Wars). 
24 Id. at 290. 
25 Shepard Krech III, Buffalo Tales: The Near-Extermination of the American Bison, NAT’L 
HUMANITIES CTR., 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntecoindian/essays/buffaloc.htm (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2017). Indeed, the destruction of the buffalo and the subjugation of Native Americans 
were seen as complimentary efforts by some at the time. James Throckmorton, a former governor 
of Texas and U.S. Congressman, held this view. In 1876, he said, “it would be a great step forward 
in the civilization of the Indians and the preservation of peace on the border if there was not a 
buffalo in existence.” DANIEL BRISTER, IN THE PRESENCE OF BUFFALO: WORKING TO STOP THE 
YELLOWSTONE SLAUGHTER (2013). A military general at the time is reported to have said that 
buffalo hunters “did more to defeat the Indian nations in a few years than soldiers did in 50.” See 
MARTIN J. SMITH, THE WILD DUCK CHASE: INSIDE THE STRANGE AND WONDERFUL WORLD OF 
THE FEDERAL DUCK STAMP CONTEST (2013). 
26 HORACE GREELEY, AN OVERLAND JOURNEY, FROM NEW YORK TO SAN FRANCISCO IN THE 
SUMMER OF 1859 (1860). At the height of their population, it is estimated that there were as many 
as 75 million buffalo living on America’s prairies. American buffalo (bison, bison), U.S FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/species/species_accounts/bio_buff.html (last visited Mar. 
22, 2017). 
27 Robert C. Kennedy, The Last Buffalo, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/
learning/general/onthisday/harp/0606.html. 
28 Nature: American Buffalo: Spirit of a Nation (PBS television broadcast Nov. 10, 1998). 
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carcasses to rot alongside tracks from Nebraska to Utah.29 A 
contemporary account of a hunt by rail in Harpers Weekly magazine 
gives a sense of the scale of depredation: 
Nearly every railroad train which leaves or arrives at Fort Hays on the 
Kansas Pacific Railroad has its race with these herds of buffalo; and a 
most interesting and exciting scene is the result. The train is “slowed” to 
a rate of speed about equal to that of the herd; the passengers get out fire-
arms which are provided for the defense of the train against the Indians, 
and open from the windows and platforms of the cars a fire that resembles 
a brisk skirmish. Frequently a young bull will turn at bay for a moment. 
His exhibition of courage is generally his death-warrant, for the whole 
fire of the train is turned upon him, either killing him or some member of 
the herd in his immediate vicinity.30 
There was even a celebrity culture built around killing bison. 
Commercial bison hunter Buffalo Bill Cody derived his fame in no small 
part from the widely shared, and possibly apocryphal, tale that he once 
killed 4,000 bison over the course of just two hunting seasons.31 Even 
future President Theodore Roosevelt, who later became an early and 
passionate advocate for conserving America’s wild lands, participated in 
the massacre. As a young man in 1883, Roosevelt spent a season in the 
Dakota Territory hunting bison for sport.32 By 1900, the American bison 
was on the brink of extinction, victim both to America’s relentless push 
westward and to Americans’ desire for belts, coats, and other wearables 
made of bison.33 
At the same time the bison on America’s vast plains was being 
decimated by commercial hunters, another far smaller animal that 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
29 Gilbert King, Where the Buffalo No Longer Roamed, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/where-the-buffalo-no-longer-roamed-3067904/ (“The 
railroads began to advertise excursions for ‘hunting by rail,’ where trains encountered massive 
herds alongside or crossing the tracks. Hundreds of men aboard the trains climbed to the roofs and 
took aim, or fired from their windows, leaving countless 1,500-pound animals where they died.”). 
30 Buffalo Hunting: Shooting Buffalo From the Trains of the Kansas Pacific Railroad, 
HARPER’S WEEKLY (Dec. 14, 1867). 
31 JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 509 (2010). 
32 SARAH WATTS, ROUGH RIDER IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE 
POLITICS OF DESIRE 175 (2006). Interestingly, near the end of his life, former President Roosevelt 
wrote eloquently about the value of preserving wild birds: “[Birds] should be saved because of 
reasons unconnected with any return in dollars and cents . . . .[T]o lose the chance to see frigate-
birds soaring in circles above the storm, or a file of pelicans winging their way homeward across 
the crimson afterglow of the sunset, or a myriad terns flashing in the bright light of the midday as 
they hover in a shifting maze above the beach-why, the loss is like the loss of a gallery of 
masterpieces of the artists of old time.” THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A BOOK-LOVER’S HOLIDAY IN 
THE OPEN 316–17 (1916). 
33 American buffalo (bison, bison), supra note 26 (“Less than 300 wild [buffalo] remained in 
the U.S. and Canada by the turn of the century out of the millions that once lived there.”). 
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traveled at sixty miles an hour in mind-bendingly huge numbers above 
those open expanses was suffering the same kind of depredation by 
commercial hunters. The passenger pigeon,34 which darkened the skies 
over the United States in flocks that could number in the tens of millions 
of birds in the 17th and 18th centuries, was on the brink of extinction at 
the beginning of the 20th century.35 Most Americans alive today have at 
least a passing familiarity with the extinction story of the passenger 
pigeon. But to truly understand the scale, scope, and speed of the 
decimation of the passenger pigeon, which by some estimates was once 
the most abundant bird species on Earth,36 one must first grasp the 
ubiquity of the passenger pigeon in 19th century America.37 In his article, 
Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, Barry Yeoman provides several 
first-person accounts from those alive at that time attesting to the awe-
inspiring experience of being in the presence of these enormous flocks on 
the wing, including a Potawatomi tribal leader comparing the sound made 
by an advancing flock to “an army of horses laden with sleigh bells;” a 
resident of Columbus, Ohio describing an approaching flock as a growing 
cloud that blotted out the sun as it advanced toward the city; and the 
following account in the Fond du Lac, Wisconsin paper, the 
Commonwealth, of a group hunters witnessing adult male passenger 
pigeons leaving their nesting site one morning in 1871: “Imagine a 
thousand threshing machines running under full headway, accompanied 
by as many steamboats groaning off steam, with an equal quota of R.R. 
trains passing through covered bridges—imagine these massed into a 
single flock, and you possibly have a faint conception of the terrific 
roar.”38 
And, yet, like the bison, at the turn of the 20th century, the passenger 
pigeon was a species on the precipice of extinction. What caused this 
incredible decline? In short, people did. People who viewed the passenger 
pigeon as a biblically-sized plague that, like the locusts in the Old 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
34 The passenger pigeon’s scientific name is Ectopistes (“moving about or wandering”) 
migratorius (“migrating”). The Passenger Pigeon, ENCYCLOPEDIA SMITHSONIAN, 
http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmnh/passpig.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (“The scientific 
name carries the connotation of a bird that not only migrates in the spring and fall, but one that also 
moves about from season to season to select the most favorable environment for nesting and 
feeding.”). 
35 See Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON MAGAZINE, June 
2014, http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2014/why-passenger-pigeon-went-extinct. 
36 The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 34 (“It is believed that this species once constituted 25 to 
40 percent of the total bird population of the United States.”). 
37 There were an estimated 3–5 billion passenger pigeons in America when Europeans first 
arrived. Id. 
38 Yeoman, supra note 35. 
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Testament,39 meant to lay waste to their crops and their livelihoods. 
People who were living at a subsistence level and were desperate for the 
jolt of protein a cooked passenger pigeon could inject into their meager 
diets. And, most significantly, people who longed for the adornment a 
passenger pigeon feather could add to their fancy headwear. Regular 
people hunted passenger pigeons either to add protein to their diets or to 
keep the enormous flocks from feasting on their crops,40 but the primary 
cause of this dramatic population plunge was the practice known as 
“millinery murder.”41 During the latter half of the 19th century 
commercial (or market) hunters killed migratory birds, including 
passenger pigeons, in enormous numbers to harvest their feathers for use 
in fashionable women’s hats.42 As but one example, it is estimated that 
during one nine-month period in the late 19th century, nearly 130,000 
snowy egrets (prized for their pure white feathers) were killed by 
commercial hunters in the United States for the London, England 
millinery market alone.43 
The industrial onslaught against passenger pigeons was 
comprehensive, its impact devastating. In less than half a century the 
passenger pigeon population went from inspiring comparisons with 
biblical hordes to extinction. The last passenger pigeon left on the planet, 
a lonely spinster named Martha, died without ever having laid a fertile 
egg in the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914, four years before the passage of the 
MBTA.44 In addition to the passenger pigeon, the list of birds killed and 
trapped in numbers large enough to drive their species to extinction 
during this period includes the only species of parakeet native to the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
39 Exodus 10:12 (“And the Lord said to Moses, “Stretch out your hand over Egypt so that locusts 
swarm over the land and devour everything growing in the fields, everything left by the hail.’”). 
40 Yeoman, supra note 35 (noting that at the height of their abundance in North America, the 
flocks of passenger pigeons were so large that birds could be hunted by waving a pole in the air to 
knock down low-flying birds. Other “creative” techniques for bird slaughter enumerated in the 
article included torching their roosts, asphyxiating them with burning sulfur, attacking them with 
potatoes, and poisoning them with whiskey-soaked corn); see also Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a 
Solution: Incidental Taking Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, n.12 (2014) (discussing a 1978 massacre by commercial hunters of “hundreds of 
thousands, indeed millions” of passenger pigeons nesting at Petoskey, Michigan). 
41 William Souder, How Two Women Ended the Deadly Feather Trade, SMITHSONIAN 
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/how-two-women-ended-
the-deadly-feather-trade-23187277/ (“The plume trade was sordid business. Hunters killed and 
skinned the mature birds, leaving orphaned hatchlings to starve or be eaten by crows.”). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (quoting William Hornaday, director of New York Zoological Society, describing London 
at this time as “the Mecca of the feather killers of the world.”). 
44 Yeoman, supra note 35. The last known passenger pigeon to be killed in the wild was shot in 
Pike County, Ohio in 1900. The bird was stuffed and mounted by the sheriff’s wife, who used 
buttons instead of glass eyes, which led to its nickname of “Buttons.” Id. 
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eastern United States, the Carolina Parakeet,45 whose brightly colored 
feathers were prized for the adornment they gave to women’s hats, and 
Heath Hens, a related species to the prairie chicken, that were hunted to 
extinction for their delicious meat by American settlers in the late 19th 
century.46 
This widespread slaughter and species decimation, even occurring 
during a time when the average American resembled in no way what 
people today would describe as a “conservationist” (let alone its more 
freighted adjectival cousin, “environmentalist”), finally began to draw the 
attention of progressive Americans47 and some lawmakers. One such 
lawmaker was Republican Congressman John F. Lacey of Iowa, who 
proposed the bill in Congress that in 1900 became The Lacey Act,48 a 
predecessor of the MBTA. In introducing his proposed bill, the country’s 
first law specifically aimed at breaking the back of the market hunting 
industry by banning the interstate shipping of illegally-killed animals, 
Lacey said on the House floor: 
The wild pigeon, formerly in this country in flocks of millions, has 
entirely disappeared from the face of the earth . . . .We have given an 
awful exhibition of slaughter and destruction, which may serve as a 
warning to all mankind. Let us now give an example of wise conservation 
of what remains of the gifts of nature.49 
The Lacey Act is perhaps better known today for its contributions to 
our understanding of the limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
to regulate interstate commerce, but, as the United States’ oldest federal 
wildlife protection law, it remains an important tool in regulating the 
hunting, trapping and poaching of animals and birds. 
The legislative response to the widespread hunting and killing of 
migratory birds by market hunters continued in 1913 with Congress’s 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
45 The Carolina Parakeet was declared extinct by the American ornithologists union in 1939. In 
a sad parallel to the extinction of the passenger pigeon, like Martha—the last captive passenger 
pigeon—the last known member of the species, Incas, also died in captivity at the Cincinnati Zoo 
in 1918, the same year the MBTA became law. Ironically, Incas died in the same aviary cage used 
to house the last passenger pigeon, Martha. See The last Carolina Parakeet, JOHN JAMES AUDUBON 
CENTER AT MILL GROVE, http://johnjames.audubon.org/last-carolina-parakeet (last visited Mar. 
22, 2017). 
46 See REBECCA HEISMAN, The Sad Story of Booming Ben, Last of the Heath Hens, JSTOR 
DAILY (Mar. 2, 2016), https://daily.jstor.org/last-heath-hen/. 
47 Two such people were Boston socialites, Harriet Hemenway and Minna Hall, who in 1896 
undertook a grassroots campaign in the parlors of Boston elites to convince their wealthy female 
friends to boycott feathered hats. Emboldened by the success of this campaign (900 women agreed 
to join the boycott), Hemenway and Hall started the Massachusetts Audubon Society, which would 
eventually grow into the National Audubon Society, America’s leading bird conservation advocacy 
group. See Souder, supra note 41, at 1. 
48 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (2012). 
49 33 CONG. REC. 4,871–72 (Apr. 30, 1900). 
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passage of the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act.50 The Act was 
directly targeted at stopping millinery murder. It banned the spring 
shooting of migratory game and insectivorous birds, and brought them 
under the “custody and protection” of the federal government.51 While 
the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act had a short lifespan—it was ruled 
unconstitutional by two federal district courts just a year later on the 
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause 
of the Unites States Constitution52—the growing legislative and popular 
sentiment against indiscriminate market hunting of migratory birds was 
clear. This sentiment would find its legislative outlet just three years later 
in the MBTA. 
C. The Act and its Amendments 
The failure of the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act to pass 
constitutional muster meant the federal government remained essentially 
powerless to control the very real and continuing threat to migratory birds 
from interstate commercial hunting, which continued unabated (and 
largely unregulated) in many states in the second decade of the 20th 
century. While Congress lacked a tool for enforcement, the legislative 
will to protect migratory birds from widespread slaughter that led to the 
passage of the Weeks-McLean Act remained strong. After all, as shown 
by the extinction of the passenger pigeon, the Carolina parakeet, and the 
Heath Hen, all species that were brought to extinction in far less than one 
century, there was good reason for Congress to be concerned about 
continued threats to migratory birds from anthropogenic activities at this 
time. 
The problem Congress had to solve was how it could assume authority 
for regulating the largely intrastate bird-killing activities from the states 
without running afoul of constitutional limitations on its lawmaking 
powers. Fortunately for Congress (and for the birds it sought to protect), 
lawmakers in the United States were not alone in this concern for the 
continued survival of the remaining migratory bird species. Some of these 
migrating species crossed the border between the United States and 
Canada during their migrations, and the Canadian government also had 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
50 Weeks-McLean Act of 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847–48(repealed 1918). The Act was co-
sponsored by Massachusetts Representative John Weeks and Connecticut Senator George McLean. 
51 Id. 
52 United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (holding that Congress lacked the 
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the hunting of migratory birds within a state); United 
States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (“[I]f the [Weeks-McLean Act] shall, on any 
ground, or for any reason, be upheld and enforced, it must surely follow [that] the many laws of the 
separate States of this Union must hereafter be held inoperative, for there can be no divided 
authority of the nation and several States over the single subject matter in issue.”). 
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an interest in protecting them from industrial slaughter. This shared 
conservational concern offered a solution to the problem that Congress 
had been searching for—it would use its treaty-making powers,53 not its 
lawmaking authority, to assert authority over activities directed at killing 
birds.54 
On August 16, 1916, two years after the Weeks-McClean Act was 
declared unconstitutional, the United States and Great Britain (acting on 
behalf of Canada, then part of the British Empire) signed a treaty for the 
protection for certain species of birds which migrate between the United 
States and Canada, in order to assure the preservation of species either 
harmless or beneficial to man.55 The “Canada Treaty” was ratified by the 
United States on September 1, 1916 and by Great Britain on October 20, 
1916.56 It is clear from the legislative record of the Canada Treaty that the 
U.S. federal government was strongly motivated to act in an effort to gain 
control over the type of commercial over-hunting that led to the 
extinction of the passenger pigeon.57 It is also the case that the specific 
restrictions on human activity within the Canada Treaty all involve time, 
place, and manner limitations on hunting and poaching of migratory 
birds.58 It is important, however, to read these restrictions in light of the 
Canada Treaty’s broad conservation goal to preserve migrating bird 
species and to understand them within the context of the time they were 
written, when the most pressing threat to migrating birds was 
uncontrolled commercial hunting. In other words, while hunting and 
poaching activities feature prominently in the enumerated restrictions in 
the Canada Treaty, the broad conservation goal of species preservation 
undergirding the treaty suggests that the two countries intended their 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
54 See Alexander K Obrecht, Migrating Towards an Incidental Take Permit Program: 
Overhauling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Comport with Modern Industrial Operations, 54 
NAT. RES. J. 107, 113 (2014) (“Unable to protect migratory birds through its interstate commerce 
powers, Congress next turned to its treaty powers and succeeded in wresting some of the power to 
regulate wildlife away from the states.”). 
55 Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory 
Birds, Gr. Brit-U.S., T.S. No. 628 (Aug. 16, 1916) [hereinafter Canada Treaty]. 
56 Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/treaty.html#MIGBIRDCAN (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
57 For an entertaining discussion of the legislative wrangling in the United States about the 
Canada Treaty, see KURKPATRICK DORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.-
CANADA WILDLIFE PROTECTION TREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 211–13 (2009) (quoting an 
unnamed senator at the time telling James A. Reed, Senator from Missouri and emphatic opponent 
of the Canada Treaty, “We have got to protect these birds and we are going to do it now, so sit 
down, Jim!”) (emphasis in original); see also Kristina Roxan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR., MICH. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW (2014). 
58 See, e.g., Canada Treaty, supra note 55, Art. II (setting the locations and durations of “close 
hunting seasons” for certain migratory bird species). 
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agreement to reflect a more generalized desire to place reasonable limits 
on anthropogenic harm to migratory birds, whatever form it took.59 
It happens that at the time of the treaty, the human activity primarily 
responsible for the dramatic depopulation of several bird species that 
migrated between the United States and Canada and that spurred the 
agreement was market hunting (an industrial directed activity). But it 
seems highly likely from the legislative history of the Canada Treaty that 
if another industrial cause was the primary driver of the depopulation, 
even one that was not directed at birds but which nevertheless caused 
them great harm (i.e., an industrial non-directed activity)—such as the 
rapid deforestation of the eastern U.S. hardwood forests, which were 
preferred habitat for several species of migratory birds, including the 
passenger pigeon60—the Canada Treaty’s specific restrictions would be 
different but the overarching goal of species preservation (“to assure the 
preservation of species either harmless or beneficial to man”) would be 
the same. 
Put another way, the specific human activity causing the threat was 
somewhat beside the point. What mattered most to the proponents of the 
Canada Treaty was the deleterious impact on bird species from human 
activity, not the activity itself.61 In a letter to President Woodrow Wilson 
encouraging him to sign the Canada Treaty, Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, chief U.S. negotiator of the Treaty, listed commercial hunting 
as but one of several activities (along with increased agriculture and 
draining of swamps and meadows) that had “so altered conditions” in the 
United States in recent years that “few migratory game birds nest within 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
59 The Canada Treaty’s preamble attributes the danger of bird species extermination to “a lack 
of adequate protection.” Canada Treaty, supra note 55, Preamble. 
60 LOWELL DINGUS AND TIMOTHY ROWE, MISTAKEN EXTINCTION: DINOSAUR EVOLUTION 
AND THE ORIGIN OF BIRDS 286–91 (1997) (arguing that the destruction of the passenger pigeon’s 
habitat in the eastern United States was a larger contributor to the extinction of the species than was 
rampant and uncontrolled hunting by commercial hunters). 
61 This view also finds support in the 1995 amendments to the Canada Treaty between the 
United States and Canada (now acting on its own behalf), which, in addition to providing for the 
subsistence hunting of protected birds by Alaska Natives and Aboriginal people in Alaska and 
northern Canada, reaffirmed the countries’ broad conservation goals and replaced most of the 
original treaty’s provisions with specific restrictions on anthropogenic harms that extend well 
beyond hunting and poaching. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, Can.-U.S., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-28, 1995 WL 877199 (Dec. 5, 1995). 
Specifically, the amendments provided that the U.S. and Canada would “take appropriate measures 
to preserve and enhance the environment of migratory birds[,] seek means to prevent damage to 
such birds and their environments, including damage resulting from pollution[, and] pursue 
cooperative agreements to conserve habitat essential to migratory bird populations.” For a thorough 
discussion of the 1995 amendments to the Canada Treaty see Alexander K. Obrecht, supra note 54, 
at 114–15; see also Development of a Permit for Incidental Take of Migratory Birds, HOLLAND & 
HART & INGAA FOUND., 9–10 (2010). 
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our limits” and made the Treaty necessary.62 Lansing went on to describe 
the Canada Treaty as a “conservation measure of prime importance.”63 
The United States implemented the Canada Treaty by passing the 
MBTA in 1918.64 The MBTA was challenged almost immediately after 
its passage by the state of Missouri, which brought suit to prevent U.S. 
Game Warden, Ray P. Holland, from enforcing the Act against Missouri 
residents.65 Missouri argued that the MBTA unconstitutionally interfered 
with Missouri’s reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment and violated 
the state’s sovereignty.66 The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1920.67 In a 7-2 decision, the Court found no violation of the Tenth 
Amendment, and held that the MBTA was a necessary and proper means 
of effectuating the Canada Treaty under Article I, Section 8, of the 
Constitution.68 The Court noted that the protection of migratory birds that 
reside in multiple states and countries requires national action in the form 
of an international treaty enforced with a congressional act, as it was done 
with the MBTA.69 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes, noted that 
“[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any 
powers to deal with.”70 At long last, the U.S. government had the law it 
wanted to thwart anthropogenic activities that had led to the decimation 
of the passenger pigeon and other migratory bird species. The question 
for the next one hundred years would be exactly to which of these 
activities (and actors) the new law should apply. 
It is noteworthy that the new law did not simply mirror the Canada 
Treaty’s prioritization of impact over cause, but expanded it in several 
important respects, including, most significantly, in its broad definition 
of prohibited acts and in its use of a strict liability standard for 
violations.71 The bird species selected for protection under the MBTA in 
1918 included many non-game birds, offering further evidence that 
Congress at the time was concerned with protecting birds from harms that 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
62 H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2. Later in that same letter, Secretary Lansing wrote that “millions 
of people in the United States are deeply interested in the conservation and increase of our bird life 
from an esthetic viewpoint, as well as on account of their practical utility.” Id. at 3. 
63 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
64 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–11 (2012). 
65 United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919). 
66 Id. 
67 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
68 Id. at 432–35. 
69 Id. at 435. 
70 Id. 
71 See Monica Carusello, Can an Oil Pit Take a Bird?: Why the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
Should Apply to Inadvertent Takings and Killings by Oil Pits, 31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 87, 108 
(“Congress was unmistakably primarily concerned with hunting [when it passed the MBTA]; 
however, the statutory language also makes clear that hunting was not its sole concern.”). 
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went beyond the damage wrought by hunters and poachers.72 As one 
congressman at the time described it, “[t]he birds dealt with [in the 
MBTA] are of three classes—migratory game birds, migratory 
insectivorous birds, and migratory nongame birds.”73 Further, as was the 
case in the Canada Treaty, the drafters of the MBTA explicitly recognized 
the value of preserving birds for their aesthetic value to humans as well 
as the irreplaceable benefit to farmers birds provided by eating insects 
that feed on crops.74 
This expansion of the Canada Treaty through the MBTA was not an 
accident; it was entirely intended by the drafters of the Act.75 The 
congressional opponents of the Act recognized this expansion and 
expressed their concerns about the MBTA’s potentially extensive reach. 
Among these opponents was Alabama congressman George Huddleston, 
who, referring to the provision in the Act that made it unlawful to take a 
bird except in accordance with rules promulgated by the Secretary of the 
Interior, said: “If the secretary . . . does not want you to do so, you will 
never kill another duck or any bird protected by this bill, whether it is a 
game bird or not . . . .[T]hat is all there is to that.”76 The broad 
conservational spirit animating the Act can also be seen in the statement 
of Iowa Congressman Simeon D. Fess in 1918 in support of the bill: “I 
am in favor of protecting the birds. My admiration for our little friends of 
the air makes me unfriendly to the habit of killing off these winged 
visitors, whether game birds, migratory birds, or other species.”77 
Unlike the Canada Treaty, the MBTA does not limit itself to placing 
time, place, and manner restrictions on migratory bird hunting activities 
to preserve bird populations. To the contrary, the Act defines its reach in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
72 Among the bird species covered by the MBTA in 1918 were many species of song and 
insectivorous birds that were not hunted by humans. 
73 56 CONG. REC. H7369 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Temple). 
74 See id. at H7458 (1918) (statement of Rep. Smith: “If we are going to have a treaty about 
migratory birds, let us have some place where they can come and remain safely and be a pleasure 
and companions.”); id. at H7360 (statement of Rep. Stedman pointing out that among the MBTA’s 
many purposes is protecting insectivorous migratory birds from harm). 
75 See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082 (D. Colo. 1999) 
(“[T]here is no clearly expressed legislative intent that the MBTA regulates only physical conduct 
associated with hunting or poaching.”). 
76 56 CONG. REC. H7364 (1918) (statement of Rep. Huddleston). 
77 Id. at H7357. Other members of congress at the time expressed similar views about the scope 
of the Act, including Rep. Stedman (“[T]he purpose of this bill is to give effect to the convention . . . 
Insectivorous migratory birds as well as migratory game birds are embraced in the terms of the 
treaty.” Id. at H7364.) and Rep. Huddleston (“[This bill] puts it within the power of the Secretary 
of Agriculture to forbid the killing of game birds as much as the killing of song or insectivorous 
birds. They are put on the same level.” Id. at H7369.). 
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almost the broadest possible terms, making it unlawful at any time, and 
by any means or in any manner, for a “person”78 to: 
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, 
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to 
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, 
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for 
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause 
to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or 
export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, 
or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or 
is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, 
or egg thereof.79 
A “take” of a migratory bird is defined in the rules implementing the 
MBTA as pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, 
capturing, or collecting a protected bird, or any attempt to do so.80 
It is apparent from the Act’s broad take language, its strict liability 
formulation that requires no mens rea (mental state) to establish 
misdemeanor liability, and from much of its legislative history that the 
proponents of the MBTA (both in Congress and in the executive branch) 
believed they were creating a law that would have application to human-
caused harm to birds beyond just that caused by out-of-season hunting 
and poaching. Congress’s ambitious yet realistic approach to the Act’s 
conservation goal, which sought to balance the MBTA’s preservation 
ethic with the country’s industrial, commercial, and residential bird-
killing reality, can also be seen in the fact that Section 703(a)’s broad 
definition of prohibited activities under the Act is prefaced with the 
caveat, “unless and except as permitted by regulations made as 
hereinafter provided in this subchapter.”81 This opened the door to 
rulemakings by the Department of Interior to decriminalize certain 
activities that kill protected birds.82 Further, Section 704(a) of the Act 
provides that the Secretary of the Interior is “authorized and directed, 
from time to time, . . . to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by 
what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow 
hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
78 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013). A “Person” is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 as “any individual, firm, 
corporation, association, partnership, club, or private body, any one or all, as the context requires.” 
79 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). 
80 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2016). 
81 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). 
82 See also Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability Under 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 605 (2012) (“Congress made a sweeping 
prohibition that would be unrealistic to enforce—a prohibition that could, at some point, touch 
nearly everyone’s activities—and then asked the Secretary to carve out an enforceable plan.”). 
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transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or 
egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing 
the same.”83 However, to date, outside of rules allowing for the issuance 
of permits for the intentional take of protected birds for certain, limited 
public, scientific, and educational purposes,84 and for incidental takings 
of migratory birds by military readiness activities, the Department of the 
Interior has not altered through rulemaking the MBTA’s fundamental 
prohibition in Section 703(a) as it applies to industrial and nonindustrial 
activities that intentionally or unintentionally kill birds. 
The MBTA has been amended three separate times to implement 
migratory bird protection treaties with other countries: first with Mexico 
in 1936 (“Mexico Treaty”),85 then with Japan in 1972 (“Japan Treaty”),86 
and finally with the U.S.S.R. (present-day Russia) in 1976 (“Russia 
Treaty”).87 While the four treaties implemented through the MBTA differ 
in certain respects, they share the same guiding conservation principle 
first enunciated in the Canada Treaty. In its preamble, the Mexico Treaty 
provides that the purpose of the treaty is the protection of migratory birds 
from extinction.88 Similarly, the Japan Treaty describes its reason for 
existence as a desire by the two countries to “cooperate in taking 
measures for the management, protection, and prevention of the 
extinction of certain birds.”89 The Russia Treaty followed form with its 
statement that the United States and the U.S.S.R. entered into the treaty 
to “cooperate in implementing measures for the conservation of 
migratory birds and their environment.”90 Like the Canada Treaty, 
however, each of these treaties expressly recognizes that the signatory 
countries must allow the taking of protected birds in certain situations so 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
83 16 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
84 50 C.F.R. § 21. Under the Service’s migratory bird permit program, regional offices issue 
permits for the intentional take of listed birds for the following listed purposes: falconry, raptor 
propagation, scientific collecting, rehabilitation, conservation education, migratory game bird 
propagation, salvage, depredation control, taxidermy, and waterfowl sale and disposal. See Permits 
Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/permits/overview/overview.html 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017). According to the Service, these permits “enable the public to engage 
in legitimate wildlife-related activities that would otherwise be prohibited by law . . . [and] ensure 
that such activities are carried out in a manner that safeguards wildlife.” Id. 
85 Convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory 
Birds and Game Mammals, Mex.-U.S., 50 Stat. 1311 (Feb 7, 1936) [hereinafter Mexico Treaty]. 
86 Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their 
Environment, Japan-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 7990 (Mar. 4, 1972) [hereinafter Japan Treaty]. 
87 Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
T.I.A.S. No. 9073 (Nov. 19, 1976) [hereinafter Russia Treaty]. 
88 Mexico Treaty, supra note 85, Preamble. 
89 Japan Treaty, supra note 86, Preamble. 
90 Russia Treaty, supra note 87, Preamble. 
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as not to unreasonably burden their citizens’ uses of land for commercial 
and recreational activities. The Mexico Treaty permits the “rational 
utilization of migratory birds for the purpose of sport as well as for food, 
commerce and industry.”91 The Japan Treaty provides that the “taking of 
the migratory birds or their eggs shall be prohibited,” but also allows for 
exceptions to this prohibition in accordance with Japan and American 
laws and regulations for “scientific, educational, propagative or other 
specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of [the Japan 
Treaty].”92 The Russia Treaty contains essentially the same language as 
the Japan Treaty in this regard.93 
Congress amended the MBTA in 1986 to require scienter for a felony 
conviction under Section 707(b), which concerns taking a migratory bird 
for the purpose of selling it.94 This amendment came in response to a Sixth 
Circuit decision in United States v. Wulff, which held that the absence of 
a knowledge requirement for a felony criminal conviction under Section 
707(b) violated the Constitution’s due process requirements.95 The 
amendment added the word “knowingly” to Section 707(b) to “cure the 
unintended infirmity” and “require proof that the defendant knew (1) that 
his actions constituted a taking, sale, barter, or offer to sell or barter, as 
the case may be and (2) that the item so taken, sold, or bartered was a bird 
or portion thereof.”96 It is significant that Congress expressly did not add 
a scienter requirement to misdemeanor MBTA violations under Section 
707(a) when it amended Section 707(b), leaving Section 707(a)’s strict 
liability scheme intact.97 
The last significant amendment to the MBTA occurred in 1998, when 
Congress added an intent requirement for “baited field offenses.”98 Prior 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
91 Mexico Treaty, supra note 85, Preamble. 
92 Japan Treaty, supra note 86, at Art. III.I. 
93 Russia Treaty, supra note 87, at Art. II.I (providing that “[e]xceptions to these prohibitions 
must be made on the basis of laws, decrees or regulations [for] scientific, educational, propagative, 
or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention[.]”). 
94 16 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
95 United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (1986) (“[T]o be convicted of a felony under the 
MBTA, a crime unknown to the common law which carries a substantial penalty, Congress must 
require the prosecution to prove the defendant acted with some degree of scienter. Otherwise, a 
person acting with a completely innocent state of mind could be subjected to a severe penalty and 
grave damage to his reputation. This, in our opinion, the Constitution does not allow.”); S. REP. 
NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986) (“The effect of [the Wulff decision] is that the felony provisions are 
meaningless within the 6th Circuit and uncertainty now exists throughout the rest of the country.”). 
96 S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986). 
97 Id. (“Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for 
misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in many 
Federal court decisions.”). 
98 Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590; Migratory Bird Treaty 
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, 112 Stat. 2956. 
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to this amendment, a hunter could be convicted of a misdemeanor 
violation under the MBTA for taking a bird over a baited field even if the 
hunter had no knowledge that the field was baited.99 The amendment 
added a mens rea requirement that the government to secure a conviction 
show the hunter “knew or should have known” he was hunting with bait 
or over a baited field.100 Again, as with the 1986 amendment to Section 
707(b), Congress took pains to clarify that this amendment did not alter 
Section 707(a)’s general strict liability standard for non-baited field 
misdemeanor violations: “The elimination of strict liability, however, 
applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not intended 
in any way to reflect upon the general application of strict liability under 
the MBTA [for misdemeanor offenses].”101 
Lest the reader of this Article obtain the false impression that the story 
of the MBTA is one of unremitting controversy and disappointment, it is 
worth noting that enforcement of the Act is credited with the survival and 
recovery of many previously imperiled bird species. Among these species 
are the snowy egret, whose luminously white feathers were so popular for 
use in women’s hats in the 19th century that for a time they were worth 
more per ounce than gold,102 and the majestically colored wood duck, 
which was hunted to near extinction at the turn of the 20th century.103 
Despite this laudable record of species preservation, however, significant 
controversy about the appropriate reach of the MBTA continues as it 
enters its second century. The remainder of this article will examine this 
controversy and suggest a category-based approach to resolve it. 
II. THE CATEGORIES 
The list of anthropogenic causes of bird deaths is long and varied, and 
includes a spectrum of human behaviors ranging from deliberate actions 
directed at killing birds to passive acts that are in no way intended to harm 
birds but nevertheless do, and everything in between. It is quickly 
apparent from a survey of the cases, law review articles, treatises, and 
other commentary written about the MBTA that there is precious little 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
99 See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding criminal 
MBTA conviction for hunting over baited field even though evidence showed hunter did not know 
field was baited). 
100 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (2016). 
101 See S. REP. NO. 105-366, at 2 (1998). 
102 See Dave Taft, Snowy Egrets, Once Fashion Victims, Always Elegant Predators, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/nyregion/snowy-egrets-once-fashion-
victims-always-elegant-predators.html (“From near extinction, the snowy egret is once again a 
fixture along any number of coastal waterways and quiet freshwater ponds and creeks — a common 
bird along New York City’s summer shorelines.”). 
103 GUY BALDASSARRE, DUCKS, GEESE, AND SWANS OF NORTH AMERICA 280–81 (1942). 
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about the Act or its application that is generally agreed upon, except this: 
the drafters of the MBTA did not intend to criminalize every possible act 
that could result in the death of a protected bird. Nearly all commentators 
agree on this point both as a matter of common sense and from a close 
reading of the statute, which, after all, is quite broadly written. The 
disagreement comes in defining what acts should be included within the 
purview of the Act and which should be left out. 
This Article proposes a middle-ground approach to these two extremes 
based on a category-based approach to criminal misdemeanor liability 
under the MBTA: (i) misdemeanor strict liability should apply to the 
injuring or killing of a protected bird associated with Industrial and 
Nonindustrial Directed Activities (the “Shotgun”), unless such injury or 
death is permitted by applicable hunting and poaching regulations; (ii) 
misdemeanor strict liability should apply to the injuring or killing of a 
protected bird associated with Industrial Non-Directed Activities (the 
“Deadly Oil Pit”), unless such injury or death is permitted by an 
Incidental Take Permit previously obtained by the industrial actor 
pursuant to the MBTA incidental take permit system proposed in this 
Article; and (iii) any injury or death of a protected bird associated with 
Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities (the “Cute Kitten”) should be 
expressly excluded from misdemeanor liability under the MBTA rather 
than continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion to avoid absurd 
prosecutions. 
A. Industrial and Nonindustrial Directed Activities 
The MBTA does not prohibit all hunting of migratory birds. In fact, as 
discussed above, the Act specifically authorizes the Secretary of the 
Interior to adopt regulations permitting the hunting of migratory birds that 
are compatible with the terms of the Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia 
Treaties.104 Each year, the Department of Interior, acting through the 
Service, publishes framework hunting regulations in the Federal Register 
with the goal of keeping game bird harvest levels “compatible with a 
population’s ability to maintain itself.”105 Among other things, the 
framework regulations set the outside dates for opening and closing of 
hunting seasons, daily bag limits, and shooting hours.106 The earliest 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
104 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012). 
105 See Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/regulations/migratory-bird-hunting-
regulations.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). The MBTA designates 170 of its over 1,000 protected 
bird species as “game birds.” FAQs/Commonly Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/faqs.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
106 Id. 
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beginning date and latest end date for a state’s hunting season are set by 
the MBTA.107 It is only where a hunter kills a protected bird out of season, 
exceeds his or her daily bag limit, or otherwise violates the terms of the 
hunting license that a MBTA violation may obtain. These violations 
typically occur in one of two scenarios, a commercial hunt run by a 
hunting guide or, more commonly, a noncommercial hunt by a 
recreational shooter. 
1. The Activity (“The Shotgun”) 
a. Industrial Directed Activities 
A video opens with five Canada geese gliding gracefully in the dawn 
light toward what appear to be a gaggle feeding in a wheat field. With the 
volume off, it would be easy to mistake this video for a high-production-
value British Broadcasting Company (“BBC”) nature show. With the 
volume on, however, the viewer quickly understands that this is not a 
BBC production. In place of the dulcet narration of Sir David 
Attenborough is a soundtrack of pulsating heavy metal music 
incongruously accompanying the birds on their arcing path to the ground. 
When the geese are only a few feet off the ground and have set their wings 
to land, three large men dressed head-to-toe in camouflage jump to their 
feet from the coffin blinds they had been lying in, shotguns raised. One 
of the men yells, “Kill ‘em, boys” and all three begin to shoot into the 
geese, which have realized too late the trap they have fallen into and are 
desperately flapping their wings to gain elevation and escape. The video 
slows to half speed to allow the viewer to see the shotgun pellets impact 
the birds, sending them spinning one-by-one to the ground where they lay 
crumpled next to the plastic goose decoys they mistook for real birds. 
Standing over the dead geese, the same man who had given the kill order 
screams with obvious glee, “You’re not as tough as you think you are, 
Mr. Honker.”108 
The man in the video is Jeffrey Foiles, an Illinois-based hunting guide, 
and the footage described is part of his Fallin’ Skies series of DVDs, 
which have been described as “avian-death porn” for their gleeful tone 
and graphic depictions of birds being shot by Mr. Foiles and his clients.109 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
107 50 C.F.R. § 20.100 (2016). 
108 OutdoorSporting, Fallin’ Skies 4 Duck Hunting Video, YOUTUBE (uploaded Jan. 18, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67G8fPGjb9w. 
109 See Nicholas Phillips, Jeff Foiles was a rock star in the world of waterfowl hunting—until 
the feds drew a target on his back, RIVERFRONT TIMES, October 27, 2011, 
http://www.riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/jeff-foiles-was-a-rock-star-in-the-world-of-waterfowl-
hunting-until-the-feds-drew-a-target-on-his-back/Content?oid=2496416 (describing Fallin’ Skies 
176 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 35:153 
Like the market hunters in the late 19th century, Foiles, through his 
guiding business, The Fallin’ Skies Strait Meat Duck Club LLC, made 
his living by hunting birds. In Foiles’ case, his income came not from 
sending bird feathers to market but from clients who paid him to take 
them on guided bird hunts. And like many of those market hunters, he did 
so with little apparent regard for species preservation. Unlike those 
market hunters, however, Foiles conducted his hunts in an America with 
well-developed federal and state laws regulating the time, place, and 
manner of bird hunting. 
On December 9, 2010, Foiles was indicted by a federal grand jury in 
Illinois on twenty-three felony counts, including violations of the Lacey 
Act and the MBTA.110 The indictment followed an investigation into 
Foiles’ guiding activities by the Service.111 Among other things, the 
indictment alleged that from 2003 to 2007, Foiles knowingly transported 
and sold ducks and geese that had been hunted and killed by his clients 
in excess of their daily individual bag limits in violation of the MBTA, 
falsified hunting records at his club to conceal these violations, and 
filmed the illegal hunts for his Fallin’ Skies commercial hunting videos.112 
In June 2011, Foiles pleaded guilty to one Lacey Act misdemeanor 
violation for the unlawful sale of wildlife and one MBTA misdemeanor 
violation for unlawfully taking migratory game birds, and the Fallin’ 
Skies Strait Meat Duck Club LLC pleaded guilty to one Lacey Act felony 
violation for the unlawful sale of wildlife in violation of the Act and one 
felony count for making false writings in a matter within the jurisdiction 
of the Service.113 On September 21, 2011, Foiles was sentenced to thirteen 
months in prison and fined $100,000 for these violations of the MBTA 
and the Lacey Act.114 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
5 as a “three hour murder-fest” and Jeffrey Foiles as “a brash, hard-driving, all-American badass 
bird assassin.”). 
110 Professional Duck Hunter Charged with Guiding Illegal Waterfowl Hunts in Central Illinois, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/professional-duck-hunter-charged-guiding-illegal-waterfowl-
hunts-central-illinois. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Duck Hunting Violations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (June 23, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-federal-duck-hunting-violations. 
114 Professional Illinois Duck Hunter Jeff Foiles Sentenced to More Than One Year in Jail and 
Fines for Illegal Hunting and Guiding Activities, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/professional-illinois-
duck-hunter-jeff-foiles-sentenced-more-one-year-jail-and-fines-illegal. In a separate matter in 
Canada related to his guiding and hunting activities in that country, Foiles pleaded guilty to four 
violations of Canada’s Migratory Birds Convention Act and one violation of Canada’s Criminal 
Code for torturing ducks and geese, causing them unnecessary pain and suffering. United States 
Poacher Fined for Violations of Canada Laws While Hunting Waterfowl, ENV’T & CLIMATE 
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b. Nonindustrial Directed Activities 
Around the time that Jeffrey Foiles was starting his commercial bird 
hunting guiding business, another bird hunter ran afoul of the MBTA. 
Unlike Foiles, David Morgan hunted for pleasure rather than pecuniary 
gain. Morgan’s MBTA troubles stemmed from a duck hunting trip he and 
six friends took to Sawdust Pond in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana in 
2001. Morgan was hunting in his canoe when a Louisiana Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries agent pulled alongside him. The agent found eight 
dead ducks in Morgan’s canoe, which were two more than he was allowed 
to take in a single day under the terms of his duck hunting license. Morgan 
told the agent that only two of the ducks were his and that his dog had 
retrieved the other six that were shot by other hunters. Morgan was 
nevertheless charged with a misdemeanor violation of the MBTA for 
taking a listed bird beyond daily possession limits. At trial, the district 
court found Morgan guilty of a misdemeanor under Section 707(a) and 
sentenced him to three years probation and fined him $1,000. On appeal, 
the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Morgan’s argument that 
his misdemeanor conviction should be overturned because he did not 
intend to violate the MBTA.115 The Court noted that there was no dispute 
that Morgan was found in possession of a number of ducks exceeding his 
daily bag limit, and held that “possessing migratory game birds exceeding 
the daily bag limit in violation of the MBTA and its attendant regulations 
is a strict liability offense.”116 
2. The Current State of the Law 
The applicability of the MBTA to industrial and nonindustrial 
activities directed at killing birds, such as those undertaken by hunters 
Jeffrey Foiles and David Morgan has never been seriously questioned by 
the courts. In case after case, the courts have found that these “shotgun” 
activities are precisely the kind of intentional acts that Congress intended 
to criminalize when it passed the MBTA.117 Moreover, over the MBTA’s 
one hundred years of its existence, Congress has steadfastly maintained 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
CHANGE CANADA (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=
BBFFF6A3-1. Foiles was fined $14,500 USD for these violations by an Edmonton provincial court 
and banned from hunting in Canada for three years. Id. 
115 United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002). 
116 Id. 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 41 F. Supp. 433, 434 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (finding hunter 
guilty of misdemeanor MBTA conviction for shooting a duck from a powerboat); United States v. 
Tucker, 934 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (D. Colo. 1996) (hunter who shot migratory bird with illegally 
modified shotgun guilty of violating MBTA); United States v. Abbate, 439 F. Supp. 2d 625, 629 
(E.D. La. 2006) (hunter who shot two wood ducks after legal hunting hours guilty of violating 
MBTA). 
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the MBTA’s strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations of the 
Act. In addition to out-of-season hunting and poaching violations, courts 
have consistently held that the MBTA applies to other directed activities, 
both commercial and noncommercial, that take protected birds, such as 
poisoning them.118 
3. The Proposed Approach 
The legislative consistency and judicial clarity around the application 
of the MBTA to directed industrial and nonindustrial activities is a 
welcome oasis of certainty in the morass of confusion that surrounds the 
enforcement of the MBTA in other contexts. There is little genuine 
controversy that these directed activities are comfortably within the 
purview of the Act, as it was conceived by its drafters, maintained by 
Congress, interpreted by the courts, and enforced by the Service. 
Therefore, the proposed approach for this category is quite simple: don’t 
fix what isn’t broken and maintain the status quo. It gets harder from here. 
B. Industrial and Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities 
Under a plain reading of the MBTA, any act that results in the non-
permitted death of a protected bird, regardless of the intent behind it, 
violates the Act and triggers criminal liability for the bird hunter, the oil 
and gas producer, or the housecat owner, as the case may be. Conversely, 
under a more restrictive reading of the MBTA, such as that employed by 
the Fifth Circuit in the Citgo Petroleum case, only those acts that are 
directed at killing birds trigger MBTA liability.119 Under this reading the 
hunter who shoots one bird out-of-season or in excess of his daily bag 
limit should face prosecution under the Act, while the oil and gas 
producer whose oil and gas wastewater pit kills fifty birds or the housecat 
owner whose cat kills seventy-five birds should not. The former 
interpretation of the Act generally comports with the legislative intent 
behind the MBTA to protect certain bird species from anthropogenic 
harm, but is over inclusive in assigning liability to acts that the MBTA’s 
drafters would surely have seen as beyond the reasonable scope of the 
Act. The latter reading is fundamentally contrary to the conservational 
spirit behind the Act and fails to reach human causes of bird deaths that, 
while not directed at killing birds, nevertheless closely resemble the types 
of activities that spurred passage of the MBTA. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
118 See, e.g., United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding MBTA 
misdemeanor conviction of defendant who deliberately poisoned two protected birds). 
119 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 493–94 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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1. Industrial Non-Directed Activities 
a. The Activity (the “Deadly Oil Pit”) 
The operation of open-air oil and wastewater pits by oil and gas 
exploration and development companies is used to represent the 
industrial non-directed activity category because it is a lawful industrial 
activity responsible for a significant number of incidental bird deaths, 
which is undertaken in a regulated environment by corporate actors that 
profit financially from the activity, and who reasonably can be expected 
to know that their activity kills birds and accompanying legal 
implications of those deaths. This description and the proposed MBTA 
approach applies equally well to the electricity industry (including both 
the transmission and production segments), which is the other primary 
industrial activity responsible for incidental takes of protected birds.120 
When migrating, a bird must at times come to earth to rest and recover. 
Similar to the succor provided to tired long-distance motorists by the fuel, 
food, and available (if unpleasant) bathrooms found in rest stops and gas 
stations along America’s highways and interstates, landing spots for 
migratory birds, commonly called stopover sites, provide an essential 
opportunity for the migrating bird to eat, drink, and recover before 
continuing its journey.121 In the vast majority of cases, the stopover sites 
selected by migrating birds are the safe and nourishing harbors they 
appear to be from the air. But sometimes looks can be deceiving—and 
deadly. Hundreds of thousands of migrating birds die each year from 
selecting a seemingly benign body of water as a stopover site on their 
journey that turns out to be an open-air oil and wastewater pit.122 These 
poisonous traps bring a bird’s migratory journey to a premature and tragic 
end. They also create potential civil and criminal liability for the pits’ 
owners under the MBTA. 
With many millions of individual birds enjoying protection under the 
Act, the odds are fairly good that the next time you see a bird flying high 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
120 An estimated 25 million migratory birds are killed annually from colliding with electrical 
facilities, and another 5.4 million die each year from electrocutions. See Threats to Birds: 
Migratory Bird Mortality – Questions and Answers, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
121 An indication of the critical importance of these stopover sites for bird recovery can be seen 
in the fact that migrating birds typically spend more time at these stopover sites than in the air 
during migration. See Jennie Miller, How Do Tired Birds Choose Where To Stop During 
Migration?, CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.allaboutbirds.org/how-
do-tired-birds-choose-where-to-stop-during-migration/. 
122 The Service estimates that exposure to open-air oil and wastewater pits causes an estimated 
500,000 to 1 million bird deaths annually. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE 
INEFFECTIVENESS OF FLAGGING TO DETER MIGRATORY BIRDS FROM OILFIELD PRODUCTION 
SKIM PITS AND RESERVE PITS (2011). 
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overheard, rushing to points unknown, that bird belongs to an MBTA-
covered species. At present, there are over 1,000 species of birds 
protected under the MBTA, including several species of ducks, over 
thirty species of sparrows, and both the bald and the golden eagle.123 In 
total, the Act provides protection to almost all native bird species 
currently existing in the United States, including, somewhat strangely 
given the Act’s name and original purpose, some species that do not 
migrate at all.124 If a bird has the misfortune of choosing an open-air oil 
and wastewater pit as a stopover site during its journey over the Unites 
States and dies because of it, the odds would seem certain that a violation 
has occurred under Section 707(a) of the MBTA, which does not require 
that the party intended to take a migratory bird for liability to attach.125 
Under the plain language of the Act, violators can be prosecuted on a 
strict liability basis without regard to the intent behind their actions (even 
if otherwise lawful) that resulted in the taking or killing of a protected 
migratory bird.126 It would seem to follow from this that the owner of the 
pit, likely a company involved in oil and gas development,127 in which a 
protected bird dies should prepare for an enforcement action under the 
MBTA, even though the owner’s intended purpose for creating and 
operating the pit was not to kill protected birds.128 While such an 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																			
123 Revised List of Migratory Birds, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,844 (Nov. 1, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 
§ 10.13(c)(1) (2015)). The MBTA protects only species of migratory birds that are “native” to the 
United States. “Native” is defined under the Act to mean bird species that occur in the United States 
or its territories “as the result of natural biological or ecological processes.” Migratory bird species 
that were introduced to the United States by humans, either intentionally or unintentionally, are not 
protected under the Act, unless the introduction is the reintroduction of a migratory bird species 
that (i) was once native to the United States or its territories and extant in 1918 when the Act was 
passed, (ii) was completely killed off after 1918 throughout its range in the United States and its 
territories, and (iii) is being reintroduced by the Federal government. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012). 
124 See Sabrina Imbler, A Hundred-Year Legacy: The Modern Role of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty, AUDUBON (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.audubon.org/news/a-hundred-year-legacy-
modern-role-migratory-bird-treaty. 
125 When enacted in 1918, the MBTA provided one strict liability crime for violating the Act, 
but a Congressional amendment to the “Violations and Penalties” section of the Act in 1960 
separated § 707 into misdemeanor crimes for violating any provision of the Act (§ 707(a)) and 
felony crimes for sale or take with intent to sell (§ 707(b)), both with strict liability still the standard. 
See Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866 (1960). In 1986, Congress for the first time loosened the strict 
liability standard under the Act when it amended § 707(b) to require that an entity “knowingly” 
take a migratory bird to be held liable under this section. See Pub. L. No. 99-645 (1986), 100 Stat. 
3582. Crucially, however, the 1986 amendment to the Act did not add a mens rea requirement to § 
707(a)’s misdemeanor violation, leaving it a strict liability standard. 
126 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). 
127 The plain language of the MBTA extends liability to incidental killings of protected birds by 
corporate actors. See id. 
128 Oil and gas producers are by no means alone in this predicament. Other potential liability 
targets under a strict reading of the MBTA include building owners, automobile operators, and pet 
owners, each of which, as a category, is responsible for millions of unintentional takes of migratory 
birds each year. See Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the 
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enforcement action under the MBTA may indeed come, whether the pit 
owner is ultimately found liable under the MBTA for a bird’s death will 
depend upon where in the U.S. the offending oil and wastewater pit is 
located. 
Oil and wastewater pits, like uninteresting people at a cocktail party, 
have the quality of being at once ubiquitous and rarely noted. The open-
air variety of oil and wastewater pits (hereinafter “open-air pits”) poses a 
significant risk of injury or death to migratory birds that make the mistake 
of using them as a stopover site. These open-air pits are used by oil and 
gas producers throughout the exploration and production process and 
serve several different purposes, including storing drilling fluid and 
separating oil from produced water.129 In all cases, the open-air pits 
contain a toxic blend of organic and inorganic compounds that often 
prove fatal to a bird that ingests them while preening its contaminated 
feathers.130 Birds also die from drowning in the open-air pits when the oil 
in their feathers makes it impossible to stay afloat and from cold stress 
when the natural insulation provided by their feathers is lost from 
exposure to oil.131 The damage done to migrating birds by a single open-
air pit can be significant. In one study of bird mortality from open-air pits 
in Wyoming, researchers noted eighty-one bird deaths from one open-air 
pit over the course of one month.132 
There is no exact count of the number of open-air pits currently 
existing in the United States, but credible estimates put the number at 
somewhere in the range of 400,000 to 600,000.133 If the owners of these 
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open-air pits are not utilizing effective mitigation techniques to protect 
migratory birds from harm, it stands to reason that several takes of 
migratory birds in violation of the MBTA from exposure to these open-
air pits will have occurred in the time it takes to read this Article. 
In his recent note in the George Washington Journal of Energy & 
Environmental Law, Benjamin Pachito points out that there are three 
mitigation techniques that are endorsed by the Service for use by oil and 
gas producers to protect birds from injury and death caused by open-air 
pits.134 They are (1) using a closed containment system rather than an 
open-air pit, (2) eliminating open-air pits entirely or, alternatively, 
keeping oil out of the open-air pits, and (3) using a netting system to cover 
the open-air pit.135 However, as Pachito notes, most oil and gas producers 
opt for the cheaper and far less effective “mitigation” measures in their 
open-air pits of flagging, strobe lighting, and installing noisemakers and 
metal reflectors.136 There is considerable doubt about whether these 
measures in fact offer much mitigation at all. To wit, one large study of 
bird mortality from open-air pits found that these lesser mitigation 
measures have no impact on reducing bird deaths, effectively making 
them non-mitigating mitigation measures.137 
Given the clear evidence that migrating birds are being killed and 
injured by exposure to open-air pits, that these injuries and deaths, while 
unintentional, are (at least in portions of the United States) violations of 
the MBTA and its strict liability regime, that the most commonly-used 
mitigation measures at the open-air pits (e.g., flagging, lighting, noise, 
and reflectors) are entirely ineffective at keeping migrating birds from 
using these open-air pits, and that the Service has offered clear 
instructions regarding effective mitigation techniques at open-air pits, a 
person could reasonably ask why the solution to this problem isn’t staring 
us in the face. Namely, requiring oil and gas producers to utilize these 
proven mitigation techniques. After all, if existing open-air pits were 
covered in netting, converted to closed containment systems, or 
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eliminated entirely, migrating birds would no longer be tempted to use 
them as stopover sites. 
Unfortunately for migrating birds, this solution, while eminently 
reasonable in the abstract, is all but unworkable on the ground in the 
fragmented regulatory framework governing open-air pits. As Pachito 
points out, existing state (for open-air pits on private lands) and Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”) regulations (for open-air pits on federal 
lands) generally do not compel oil and gas producers to use proven 
mitigation techniques to protect migratory birds.138 Rather, these state and 
federal regulations generally recommend rather than require use of 
proven mitigation techniques, or are entirely silent on the question.139 This 
results in infrequent use of closed containment and other proven measures 
to mitigate bird deaths at open-air pits as the vast majority of oil and gas 
producers make the rational economic decision not to install the more 
expensive equipment in the absence of regulations requiring it.140 
b. The Current State of the Law 
The Service has consistently taken the position that a “take” under the 
MBTA includes any unpermitted anthropogenic bird death, regardless of 
whether the act causing the death was directed at birds or intended by the 
actor to result in the take.141 In May 2015, the Service published a notice 
of intent to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement 
under the National Environmental Policy Act to evaluate the potential 
environmental impacts of a proposed rule for the issuance of incidental 
take permits under the MBTA (“Incidental Take Notice” or “Notice”).142 
The Service referred to its “longstanding position that the MBTA applies 
to take that occurs incidental to, and which is not the purpose of, an 
otherwise lawful activity” in the Incidental Take Notice.143 Later in the 
Notice, however, the Service explicates its longstanding, self-imposed 
practice of limiting misdemeanor enforcement actions under the MBTA 
to a subset of violations and actors: 
We note that should we develop a permit system authorizing and 
limiting incidental take, we would not expect every person or business 
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that may incidentally take migratory birds to obtain a permit, nor would 
we intend to expand our judicious use of our enforcement authority under 
the MBTA. The Service focuses its enforcement efforts under the MBTA 
on industries or activities that chronically kill birds and has historically 
pursued criminal prosecution under the Act only after notifying an 
industry of its concerns regarding avian mortality, working with the 
industry to find solutions, and proactively educating industry about ways 
to avoid or minimize take of migratory birds. Similarly, our permit 
program, if implemented, will focus on industries and activities that 
involve significant avian mortality and for which reasonable and effective 
measures to avoid or minimize take exist.144 
The Service’s explicit recognition in the Notice of its long-standing 
“judicious” practice of limiting misdemeanor MBTA enforcement for 
incidental takes to industrial actors responsible for large numbers of bird 
deaths who have been forewarned by the Service of their violations and 
have the ability to mitigate these takes did not satisfy some of the parties 
who submitted comments on the proposed rule.145 Several public 
comments received by the Service on the proposed rule questioned the 
Service’s legal authority under the MBTA to make such a rule, arguing 
that the premise upon which the proposed incidental take permit rule is 
based—that the MBTA criminalizes incidental takes of migratory birds—
is faulty because the MBTA’s take prohibition extends only to acts 
directed at birds.146 Therefore, according to this reasoning, the Service is 
proposing to create a permitting regime for a class of activities and 
industries over which it has no legal authority under the MBTA. 
Some comments opposing the proposed action took pains to draw a 
distinction between the Service’s authority under the Endangered Species 
Act to issue incidental take permits for non-directed takes of listed 
species incident to lawful industrial activities and its authority to do so 
under the MBTA. An incidental take of a listed species under the ESA is 
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a take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity.”147 The comments point out that the 1982 
amendments to the ESA that created the concept of an incidental take of 
a listed species were based in part on the fact that an ESA “take” includes 
activities that “harm” or “harass” wildlife.148 They argue that the use of 
the word harm, which is defined in the ESA regulations as any act that 
actually kills or injures wildlife, including habitat modification,149 and 
harass, which means “an intentional or negligent act or omission which 
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife,”150 expanded the prohibited 
conduct under the ESA beyond intentional acts directed at wildlife to 
include non-directed acts that incidentally harm wildlife. The comments 
contrast the ESA with the MBTA, which does not include harm or 
harassment in its take definition and, outside of a limited exception for 
military activities, has not been amended by Congress to expressly 
include incidental conduct within its purview in its more than one 
hundred year history.151 Rather, they argue, the Service’s definition of an 
MBTA “take” in 50 C.F.R. 10.12, as well as the operative language of 
the MBTA in Section 703(a), only prohibit conduct that is actively 
directed at birds (“pursuing,” “hunting,” or “capturing”) and does not 
include incidental takes of birds.152 In the words of one commenter, “[t]his 
difference between the ESA and the MBTA is conclusive that Congress 
knows how to prohibit incidental conduct when it chooses, but simply 
chose not to do so in the MBTA, and reaffirmed that decision time and 
again in subsequent amendments.”153 Many of these same arguments 
against the applicability of the MBTA to incidental takes of birds formed 
the basis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Citgo Petroleum less than two 
months later. 
In Citgo Petroleum, the Fifth Circuit considered Citgo’s appeal of its 
convictions in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas for 
three misdemeanor violations of the MBTA for “taking and killing” 
migratory birds.154 The district court fined Citgo $15,000 for each MBTA 
violation.155 The MBTA convictions stemmed from the discovery of ten 
migratory bird carcasses in two open-top oil tanks at a refinery owned by 
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Citgo. The evidence presented at trial showed that the birds died from 
landing in these tanks and drowning in the oil contained therein.156 
Because the birds belonged to a species protected by the MBTA, the 
government brought criminal misdemeanor charges against Citgo for 
unlawfully taking and aiding and abetting the taking of migratory birds 
under Section 707(a).157 At trial, Citgo did not dispute that the birds died 
as a result of landing in its oil tanks, but contended that these deaths were 
not “takings” within the meaning of the MBTA because they resulted 
from the company’s lawful industrial operations that were in no way 
directed at killing or injuring birds.158 According to Citgo, the MBTA 
does not criminalize industrial activities “in which migratory birds are 
unintentionally killed as a result of activity completely unrelated to 
hunting, trapping, or poaching.”159 To find otherwise, it argued, would 
extend the reach of the MBTA to non-directed industrial activities that 
the Act’s drafters never intended to criminalize and would “yield absurd 
results.”160 For its part, the Government asserted that because the MBTA 
criminalizes the taking or killing of a migratory bird “at any time, by any 
means or in any manner,” it applies to directed activities such as hunting 
and poaching and to industrial non-directed activities by corporations that 
incidentally result in the taking and killing of migratory birds.161 
In considering the parties’ arguments, the district court surveyed cases 
from federal courts across the country, acknowledging that there was a 
significant split among the circuits on the question of whether 
misdemeanor liability for takes of migratory birds under the MBTA is 
limited to bird deaths resulting from activities that are directed at birds, 
such as hunting and poaching, or extends to non-directed activities, such 
as oil and gas production, that indirectly and unintentionally cause the 
death of protected birds.162 Among the cases standing for the former 
proposition discussed by the court were the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,163 the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Newton County Wildlife Association v. United States Forest Service,164 
and United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas L.P.,165 a federal district court 
opinion out of the Eighth Circuit. 
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The plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon appealed the district court’s denial 
of their request to enjoin timber sales in the Pacific Northwest that they 
alleged would result in the taking and killing of northern spotted owls in 
violation of the MBTA by destroying their habitat.166 The court affirmed 
the district court’s holding that a take under the MBTA must involve 
“physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers” that is 
directed at birds.167 Because the habitat modification from logging that 
plaintiff’s sought to enjoin was not directed at birds, and any bird deaths 
resulting from that modification would be incidental to the main purpose 
of the activity, the court held that these deaths cannot constitute a take 
under the MBTA or its regulations.168 
As further evidence that a take under the MBTA does not include bird 
deaths from non-directed conduct such as habitat modification, the court 
noted that the ESA’s “take” definition includes the verb “harm,” which 
includes habitat modification or degradation, while the MBTA’s 
definition of take does not.169 The court found this difference in 
prohibitions between the acts to be “distinct and purposeful,” particularly 
in light of the fact that Congress amended the MBTA in 1986, just a few 
years after the ESA amendments adding incidental take, and did not add 
harm to its take prohibition in those amendments.170 
A timber sale and its potential to result in the “take” of a protected bird 
was again at issue in Newton County, decided six years after Seattle 
Audubon. In Newton County, a coalition of environmental groups brought 
suit against the U.S. Forest Service seeking an injunction to stop proposed 
timber sales that they alleged, and the Forest Service conceded, would 
result in migratory bird deaths from logging activity.171 Plaintiffs 
contended that these bird deaths would violate the MBTA’s “absolute 
prohibition” against killing protected birds, regardless of the intent 
behind the activity that caused the deaths.172 Citing with approval Seattle 
Audubon, the Eighth Circuit refused to grant an injunction, holding that 
Section 703(a)’s plain language only prohibits conduct directed at birds 
and that it would “stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of 
reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such 
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as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory 
birds.”173 
Brigham Oil, decided just nine months before the district court’s 
decision was handed down in Citgo, relied on the holding in Newton 
County to find that the defendant oil and gas company did not violate the 
MBTA when two mallard ducks were killed when they landed in one of 
the company’s open-air oil reserve pits.174 The government charged 
Brigham under Section 707(a) with two misdemeanor criminal violations 
for taking migratory birds.175 The court began its analysis by noting that 
the MBTA does not define what it means by the word “take” in Section 
703(a), meaning the court must construe the term according to its 
ordinary meaning.176 It found this ordinary meaning in the dictionary and 
in the MBTA’s implementing regulations, both of which, according to 
the court, limit a take to an affirmative act directed at birds and not 
“accidental activity or the unintended results of other conduct.”177 
Therefore, because it found that Brigham’s operation of its open-air oil 
reserve pits was not an activity directed at birds, the fact that two birds 
were killed as an unintended consequence of Brigham’s lawful operation 
those pits did not constitute a taking under the MBTA.178 Echoing the 
Newton County court, the Bingham Oil court found it “highly unlikely” 
Congress intended to criminalize lawful industrial activity that indirectly 
kills birds under the MBTA.179 
In addition to considering these “limited reach” cases finding that 
misdemeanor liability under the MBTA extended only to activities 
directed at birds, the Citgo Petroleum district court also took note of a 
line of “expansive scope” cases from other jurisdictions that extended 
MBTA misdemeanor liability to activities that indirectly took birds.180 
The “expansive scope” cases reviewed by the district court include the 
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. FMC Corporation,181 a case 
from a Colorado federal district court, United States v. Moon Lake 
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Electric Association, Inc.,182 and United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.183 
from the Tenth Circuit. 
The activity at issue in FMC was FMC’s manufacture of pesticides at 
its plant in Middleport, New York.184 The manufacturing process created 
large amounts of wastewater that FMC stored in a ten acre pond near to 
the plant.185 Unbeknownst to FMC and despite its efforts to remove it 
from the plant’s effluent, a toxic chemical from its manufacturing process 
was seeping into the wastewater and contaminating the pond.186 Over the 
course of several months in 1975, the pond attracted birds that attempted 
to use it as a stopover site during migration.187 Almost 100 birds died from 
being exposed to the chemicals in the water.188 Based on these deaths, the 
department of justice brought a 36-count indictment against FMC for 
taking migratory birds in violation of Section 703 of the MBTA.189 In its 
defense, FMC argued that because it had no intention to kill the birds and 
took no action directed at the birds in its industrial activities, it did not 
“take” the birds within the meaning of the MBTA.190 After a jury trial, 
FMC was found guilty on eighteen of the thirty-six misdemeanor 
counts.191 
On FMC’s appeal of its convictions, the Second Circuit framed the 
legal issue before it as whether a conviction for a taking under the MBTA 
requires that the activity that resulted in the taking was intentional.192 Or, 
to put it another way, must the government prove intent to sustain a 
criminal conviction under the MBTA? In considering this question, the 
court expressed concern about endorsing a construction of the MBTA that 
“would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by 
automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture 
windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly.”193 The court 
opined that such an expansive reading of the criminal reach of the MBTA 
would “offend reason and common sense.”194 In this case, however, the 
court found a sufficient distinction between these everyday activities that 
incidentally kills birds (e.g., driving a car or flying a plane), which it said 
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should not trigger MBTA liability, and FMC’s “extrahazardous” activity 
of manufacturing toxic pesticides and failing to keep them from entering 
its wastewater pond to justify imposing strict liability on FMC under the 
MBTA.195 In other words, because FMC “engaged in an activity involving 
the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and . . . failed to prevent this 
chemical from escaping into the pond and killing birds” the fact that it 
did not intend to kill birds in its industrial activities was irrelevant to the 
question of strict liability under the MBTA.196 
More than twenty years after the Second Circuit’s decision in FMC, a 
federal district court in Colorado again took up the issue of criminal 
liability under the MBTA for the incidental take of protected birds from 
industrial non-directed activities in Moon Lake.197 Defendant Moon Lake 
Electric, an electrical distribution cooperative, supplied electricity to a 
Colorado oil field using power lines strung across over 3000 poles.198 
Because the area near the oil field was mostly treeless, several species of 
MBTA-protected birds used Moon Lake’s power poles for perching, 
roosting, and hunting.199 Over the course of a little more than two years, 
thirty-eight of these birds were electrocuted to death while using Moon 
Lake’s poles in this manner.200 In its action against Mood Lake for “taking 
and killing” misdemeanor violations of the MBTA, the government 
alleged that these deaths could have been avoided if Moon Lake had 
installed inexpensive safety equipment on the poles.201 
Moon Lake contended that these electrocutions did not violate the 
MBTA because they did not arise from the kind of an intentionally 
harmful conduct directed at birds, such as that “normally exhibited by 
hunters and poachers,” that Congress intended to criminalize under the 
MBTA.202 Because its conduct was unintentional and it undertook no 
action directed at birds, Moon Lake argued that it lacked both the mens 
rea (mental state) and actus reus (physical act) required for conviction 
under the MBTA.203 
In rejecting Moon Lake’s lack of mens rea defense, the court pointed 
to the plain language of Sections 703 and 707(a) of the MBTA.204 
According to the court, the plain wording of both sections make clear that 
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a misdemeanor violation of the Act is a strict liability crime and, 
therefore, does not require proof of intent to take a bird to sustain a 
conviction.205 To further support this view, the court pointed to 
Congress’s statement in its amendment adding a mens rea requirement 
for felonies under Section 707(b) of the Act that “[n]othing in this 
amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for 
misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C.  
§ 707(a).”206 Therefore, the court held that Moon Lake’s intent to take the 
birds, or lack thereof, was “irrelevant to its prosecution under § 707(a).”207 
The court next took up Moon Lake’s argument that it lacked the 
requisite actus reus to support a misdemeanor conviction under Section 
707(a), because it took no action directed at taking the birds. The court 
noted that while some of the types of prohibited conduct enumerated in 
the statute and its implementing regulations (hunting, capturing, 
shooting, and trapping) could be construed as applying solely to hunters 
and poachers, the inclusion of the word “killing” shows that “Congress 
intended to prohibit conduct beyond that normally exhibited by hunters 
and poachers.”208 The court was also not persuaded by Moon Lake’s 
reliance on Seattle Audubon and Newton County as support for its 
contention that the MBTA’s reach is limited to takings associated with 
hunting and poaching.209 The court found both cases inapposite to the 
conduct at issue because they dealt with plaintiffs seeking injunctions to 
stop timber sales that could lead to habitat modification or destruction 
that might result in the taking of migratory birds.210 Comparing the 
somewhat tortured causal chain presented in those cases to the more 
proximate link between Moon Lake’s activity in this case and the killing 
of birds, the district court held that the government had met its burden of 
proving proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt under Section 707(a) 
because the evidence showed that Moon Lake was aware of the danger to 
birds posed by its activities prior to the killings at issue in the case and 
failed to take the relatively inexpensive measures required to ameliorate 
it.211 In explaining what it meant by proximate cause in this context, the 
court cited the definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary: “that 
which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient 
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intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident 
could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably 
anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act.”212 
The Moon Lake court was the first federal court to suggest that 
misdemeanor liability under Section 707(a)—which the court itself 
characterized as a strict liability crime that applied to activities beyond 
hunting and poaching—was nevertheless limited to situations where the 
alleged violator reasonably anticipated or foresaw the bird deaths as a 
natural consequence of its act.213 Given its expansive view of the scope of 
the Act, the court believed this proximate cause limitation was necessary 
to avoid “absurd results” under the MBTA in the form of criminal 
prosecutions for bird deaths caused by everyday activities.214 
Because the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable 
consequence of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane, maintaining 
an office building, or living in a residential dwelling with a picture 
window, such activities would not normally result in liability under § 
707(a), even if such activities would cause the death of protected birds.215 
The court opined that this proximate cause limitation was preferable to 
relying on prosecutorial discretion to “ensure [the MBTA] does not 
ensnare those beyond its proper confines.”216 
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the Moon Lake court’s expansive scope 
limited by proximate cause view of MBTA misdemeanor liability for 
incidental takes in Apollo Energies,217 decided more than a decade later. 
The defendants in Apollo Energies, Apollo Energies, Inc. (“Apollo”) and 
Dale Walker (doing business as Red Cedar Oil) (“Walker”), were 
commercial oil field operators in Kansas that used a device at their well 
sites called a “heater-treater” to separate water and other contaminants 
from the produced oil.218 The heater-treaters at issue were metal cylinders 
twenty feet high and more than three feet wide, with vertical exhaust 
pipes and movable louvres at the base. Birds were drawn to the heater-
treaters as nest sites, but became stuck when they entered through the 
exhaust pipe or louvres.219 Working off an anonymous tip, in December 
2005, the Service inspected hundreds of heater-treaters in the area and 
discovered the carcasses of over 300 birds trapped inside, including ten 
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protected birds.220 None of these protected bird carcasses were found in 
heater-treaters belonging to Walker or Apollo.221 
Rather than immediately recommending that the offending oil field 
operators be charged with violating the MBTA, the Service decided to 
give all operators in the area a grace period of one year and undertook a 
campaign to educate the companies about the heater-treater problem.222 
The Service’s education campaign included sending letters describing the 
problem to oil companies in the area, including Apollo.223 The evidence 
at trial showed that Walker did not receive a letter at this time.224 In April 
2007, after the grace period ended, the Service again inspected the heater-
treaters. A carcass of a Northern Flicker, an MBTA-protected species, 
was found inside one of Apollo’s heater-treaters, and four carcasses of 
protected birds were discovered in Walker’s heater-treaters.225 At this 
point the Service sent Walker the educational letter.226 Another carcass 
was found in one of Walker’s heater-treaters when the service performed 
a subsequent search in 2008.227 At trial, Apollo was convicted of one 
misdemeanor violation of the MBTA for the carcass discovered in 2007 
and Walker was convicted of two misdemeanor violations, one for the 
carcasses discovered in 2007 before it received the warning letter and one 
for carcass discovered in 2008 after the letter was received.228 Citing 
Moon Lake, the lower court based its decision on its finding that 
defendants’ failures to bird-proof their heater-treaters proximately caused 
the bird deaths they were accused of, because these deaths were a 
reasonably anticipated or foreseeable consequence of these failures to 
act.229 
In their appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendants argued that the 
convictions should be overturned because they had no intent to take the 
protected birds and, even if the court finds that violations of Section 703 
are strict liability crimes, the application of the Act was unconstitutional 
as to their conduct because they were deprived of due process.230 This due 
process argument rested on defendants’ contention that because the 
MBTA criminalizes acts that are “several steps removed from bird deaths 
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or takings,” a reasonable actor has no notice that its otherwise legal and 
non-bird directed acts could give rise to criminal liability.231 
The court made quick work of defendants’ mens rea argument, relying 
on its earlier decision in United States v. Corrow232 to hold that 
misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes and, 
therefore the fact that defendants did not intend to take the birds was 
irrelevant.233 However, echoing the Moon Lake decision, the court went 
on to hold that strict liability under the MBTA satisfies due process only 
if the accused proximately caused harm to protected birds.234 In other 
words, when the defendant’s predicate acts that led to the alleged 
violation of the Act are “commonly and ordinarily not criminal” (e.g., 
lawful industrial operations that are not directed at harming birds), 
proximate causation necessary for a criminal conviction under Section 
703(a) requires that defendant was on notice that these predicate acts 
could result in a violation of the Act.235 Based on this reasoning, the court 
upheld Apollo’s single conviction and Walker’s conviction for the 2008 
violation, because both occurred after the respective parties received 
warning letters from the Service notifying them that their operations 
could result in the death of protected birds, and reversed Walker’s 
conviction for the 2007 violation that occurred before he received the 
letter.236 
After reviewing both the “limited reach” and “expansive scope” cases 
discussed above and acknowledging that the issue of MBTA 
misdemeanor liability for indirect harm to protected birds by lawful 
industrial operations was an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, 
the Citgo Petroleum district court opted to follow the Moon Lake and 
Apollo Energies strict liability tempered by proximate cause approach to 
this issue: 
The Court further adopts the Tenth Circuit’s opinion that “a strict 
liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct charged here satisfies 
due process only if defendants proximately caused the harm to protected 
birds.” Thus, the Court must determine whether it was reasonably 
foreseeable that CITGO’s operation of open-air tanks would result in bird 
deaths.237 
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In determining that Citgo violated the Act by proximately causing the 
taking of protected birds, the court placed great emphasis on Citgo’s 
failure to install roofs on its oil reserve tanks even after it was aware of 
the danger these tanks posed to birds.238 There was ample evidence 
introduced at trial showing that Citgo had known for at least a decade 
prior to the bird deaths at issue in the trial that protected birds were dying 
it its open-air tanks.239 Based on this evidence, the court held that it was 
reasonably foreseeable to Citgo that its operations could result in the 
deaths of protected birds, that Citgo had done nothing to mitigate this 
risk, and that these operations had in fact proximately caused the taking 
of migratory birds in violation of Section 703 of the MBTA.240 
Citgo’s appeal of its MBTA conviction reached the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in 2015. Reviewing Citgo’s MBTA conviction de novo, the 
appellate court began its opinion by applauding the district courts for its 
thorough review of the case law on MBTA misdemeanor liability in 
reaching its holding that an illegal “taking” under the MBTA is a strict 
liability crime that applies both to activities directed at birds, such as 
hunting and poaching, and non-directed industrial activities that 
proximately cause the death of a protected bird.241 Its appreciation for the 
lower court’s diligence notwithstanding, however, the Fifth Circuit 
wasted little time in rejecting the lower court’s expanded scope holding 
(and the rationale behind it borrowed from the Tenth Circuit’s Apollo 
Energies decision), opting instead to follow the limited reach decisions 
in Newton County and Seattle Audubon to reverse Citgo’s MBTA 
convictions: 
[W]e agree with the Eighth and Ninth circuits that a “taking” is 
limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to 
migratory birds. Our conclusion is based on the [MBTA’s] text, 
its common law origin, a comparison with other relevant statutes, 
and rejection of the argument that strict liability can change the 
nature of the necessary legal act.242 
The court emphasized that because Citgo was accused of “taking” 
protected birds, not of “killing” them, it would confine its analysis to 
determining what is meant by this term in Section 703(a) and the 
implementing regulations.243 The court agreed with the government that 
a Section 703(a) taking is a strict liability crime that does not require 
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proof that defendant intended to cause injury to a protected bird to support 
a misdemeanor conviction.244 But it disagreed that the absence of a mens 
rea requirement for takings means that even acts that indirectly or 
accidentally kill birds are “takes” under the Act.245 According to the Fifth 
Circuit, while the strict liability nature takings under Act means the 
government need not prove the defendant had criminal intent in taking a 
protected bird, it does not relieve it of the obligation to prove that 
defendant undertook an affirmative act to cause migratory bird deaths.246 
The court found compelling support for an actus reus requirement that 
limits the reach of the MBTA’s taking prohibition to activities 
intentionally directed at migratory birds in its view that the common law 
definition of the word “take” at the time the Act was passed assumed an 
affirmative act of reducing an animal to human control, which, according 
to the court, cannot be done accidentally or by omission.247 Echoing the 
Ninth Circuit in Seattle Audubon, the court bolstered this restrictive 
interpretation by comparing the MBTA’s definition of “take,” which does 
not include the concepts of harm or harassment, with the Endangered 
Species Act’s expansive definition of the concept, which does.248 
In the Fifth Circuit’s view, the fact that Congress modified the 
common law definition of “take” in the ESA to include indirect injury to 
animals by “harming” or “harassing” them, but has not similarly 
expanded the MBTA’s take prohibition to cover non-intentional acts, 
supports its reading that an MBTA “take” retains its common law 
meaning and applies only to act directed at protected birds.249 The court 
further found that Section 703(a)’s criminalizing of pursuing, hunting, 
taking, capturing or killing a protected bird “at any time, by any means, 
in any manner” does not expand its scope to cover non-directed activities, 
but merely modifies the mode of the prohibited “deliberately conducted 
activity.”250 Therefore, the court held, while it is undisputed that MBTA 
protected birds died from landing in Citgo’s uncovered oil tanks, Citgo 
did not “take” the birds in violation of the MBTA because its operation 
of these tanks was not intentionally directed at migratory birds.251 
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The Fifth Circuits decision in Citgo Petroleum, the latest judicial word 
on the applicability of the MBTA to bird deaths arising out of industrial 
non-directed activities, hardened the existing circuit split on this question. 
Thus, while it provided assurance to industrial operators that they have 
nothing to fear from the MBTA if their facilities located within the 
boundaries of the Fifth Circuit kill protected birds, this certainty is 
necessarily limited to these judicial boundaries. A solution with national 
application that will resolve the MBTA liability uncertainty plaguing 
companies with industrial operations in locations across the country 
remains elusive. 
2. Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities 
a. The Activity (the “Cute Kitten”) 
In May 2014 Ernesto Pulido, a local landscaper, was hired by the U.S. 
Postal Service to trim several ficus trees outside a post office in Oakland, 
California, because birds nesting in the trees had been defecating on mail 
trucks parked underneath them.252 As a result of Mr. Pulido’s trimming 
work, five baby black-crowned night herons were dislodged from their 
nests and injured when they impacted the ground.253 The public outcry in 
Oakland was immediate and intense. Mr. Pulido was forced to move to 
another residence in the city because of threats he received from enraged 
bird lovers.254 Fortunately none of the baby birds were grievously injured 
and all eventually made a full recovery under the care of the International 
Bird Rescue Center in Solano County, California.255 
Facing public pressure, the Service opened an investigation into the 
incident as a possible violation of the MBTA. At the close of the 
investigation the Service recommended that Pulido be charged with a 
misdemeanor violation under Section 707(a) of the MBTA and face a 
civil penalty of $1,500.256 This recommendation triggered another outcry; 
this time directed not at Mr. Pulido but at what California Congressman 
Darrell Issa called “bureaucratic bullying” by the Service in a letter he 
wrote to the Service in his capacity as Chairman of the House of 
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Representative’s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
decrying the recommendation to charge Pulido.257 
Shortly after receiving Congressman Issa’s letter, the Service and the 
U.S. Attorney’s office jointly announced that they had decided not to 
pursue MBTA charges against Pulido for the incident.258 Congressman 
Issa immediately lauded the decision not to prosecute in a press release: 
I’m glad to hear that in the case of Mr. Pulido, the bureaucratic 
bullies have backed down. The decision to press charges in the 
first place seems to have been based more on public outcry from 
outside groups and less on common sense. Mr. Pulido made a 
mistake, but took responsibility and made substantial efforts to 
make amends. The Committee still has unanswered questions 
about this entire head-scratching incident and looks forward to 
hearing directly from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which 
must still comply with the Committee’s document request.259 
b. The Current State of the Law 
The threatened but ultimately abandoned MBTA prosecution of Ernest 
Pulido surprised many observers, but perhaps not for the reason one 
might imagine. The surprising thing about the episode was not that the 
Service ultimately backed down, but that it recommended prosecution in 
the first place. The Service attributes an astonishing 2.4 billion migratory 
bird deaths each year to the predations of housecats.260 While less lethal 
than cats in terms of absolute numbers, collisions with airplanes and 
automobiles kill hundreds of millions of migratory birds each year.261 
While these nonindustrial non-directed causes of migratory bird mortality 
are orders of magnitude more damaging to migratory birds than industrial 
and nonindustrial directed activities and industrial non-directed activities, 
which combined account for a comparatively paltry 50 million bird 
deaths annually,262 they never result in MBTA prosecutions. This lack of 
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enforcement cannot be attributed to a carve-out in the Act for bird deaths 
from these everyday activities; the statute and its implementing 
regulations offer no such safe harbor. Rather, the Service and Department 
of Justice exercise their prosecutorial discretion in refraining from 
prosecuting individuals for non-directed takings of protected birds.263 
This exercise of discretion is longstanding and uniform throughout the 
country. The author could not find a single example in the long history of 
the MBTA of an individual being prosecuted for killing a protected bird 
while engaged in a nonindustrial non-directed activity, such as driving a 
car or owning a predatory housecat. 
3. The Proposed Approach 
It would be putting it kindly to say that courts have struggled to 
articulate a consistent and statutorily defensible rationale for imposing 
(or not imposing) misdemeanor MBTA liability on activities outside of 
hunting and poaching that kill protected birds. That this foundational 
question about the Act’s scope remains in doubt even as it enters its 
second century of existence is equal parts astonishing and frustrating. 
While it is tempting (and perhaps accurate) to place the lion’s share of 
the blame for this ongoing uncertainty on Congress and the Department 
of Interior, which have mostly failed for a century to add “flesh” to the 
skeletal outline of MBTA in the form of clarifying legislation or 
regulations,264 the Supreme Court bears its share of responsibility for 
allowing a decades-long circuit split to fester unresolved. The unhappy 
result of this legislative, administrative, and judicial inaction is felt most 
keenly by the industries whose activities incidentally kill birds. For them, 
the question of whether they have violated the Act when a protected bird 
dies from their industrial operations is anything but straightforward; 
depending as it does both on the law applicable to the part of the country 
where those operations are located and on the Service’s unpredictable and 
uneven enforcement of the Act. 
The current confused status of the law around misdemeanor violations 
of the MBTA for industrial non-directed activities is untenable. On the 
one hand, in large parts of the country the Act’s reach has been so 
circumscribed by judicial interpretation that it effectively has no role to 
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play in regulating industrial causes of bird mortality outside of hunting 
and poaching.265 This attenuation of the MBTA’s scope contravenes a 
plain reading of its language and implementing regulations, compelling 
legislative history showing that the law’s drafters meant to protect birds 
from multifarious harms, and the broad conservational spirit animating 
the several treaties it implements. On the other hand, even those few 
circuits that have taken a more expansive view of the Act’s reach into 
industrial non-directed activities have inappropriately cabined their 
holdings with a proximate cause requirement that makes no sense with 
the Act’s clear strict liability language266 or added a nonsensical, tort-
based restriction limiting the Act’s reach to only “extrahazardous” 
industrial activities; a limitation that finds no support in the Act or the 
treaties it implements.267 And, finally, there are the several circuits that 
have yet to rule on this question at all, creating more regulatory and legal 
uncertainty for industrial operators whose activities incidentally take 
protected birds. 
This uncertainly is felt most acutely by companies with industrial 
facilities in different parts of the country. For these businesses, whether 
or not they risk criminal liability under the MBTA should a protected bird 
be killed as an incidental consequence of operating these facilities 
depends almost entirely on where in the country the facilities are located. 
For example, consider the situation of an oil company that has drilling 
operations with open-air oil and wastewater pits in multiple locations 
across the country. After Citgo, the company can rest easy that any birds 
that die when they land in its pits located in Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi (the states making up the Fifth Circuit) will not trigger 
MBTA liability. But the same company also knows, based on the Tenth 
Circuit’s Apollo Energies decision, that it faces potential MBTA liability 
if the same thing happens in any pits it operates in Oklahoma, Utah, New 
Mexico, Colorado, Kansas or Wyoming, provided those operations are 
found to have proximately caused the bird deaths. The same would be 
true for a bird take by open-air pits in New York, Vermont, and 
Connecticut, without the proximate cause limitation, but only if these 
operations are “extrahazardous” within the meaning of the Second 
Circuit’s holding in FMC. If the company has any pits in states within the 
Eighth or Ninth Circuits, including states such as Alaska, Montana, and 
South Dakota with significant natural resource extraction activities, it 
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may take some solace in the Newton County and Seattle Audubon 
decisions that share the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive view that an MBTA 
“take” only applies to conduct directed at a bird. But the company would 
also understand that those cases dealt with timber sales that might result 
in birds dying, not bird deaths caused by industrial operations, and 
therefore may not insulate it from MBTA liability. And, to confuse 
matters even more, any bird deaths caused by pits operated in North 
Dakota, located within the Eighth Circuit, may be treated as they would 
be in the Fifth Circuit, based on the district court’s holding in Bingham 
Oil that the MBTA does not apply to incidental takes by industrial 
operations. And, finally, if any birds are killed by industrial operations in 
any of the twenty-two states outside the boundaries of Second, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the company can only guess as to its 
potential MBTA liability. It is, in short, a confusing and comprehensive 
mess that is antithetical to the nation-wide regulatory and legal certainty 
that federal laws are supposed to supply. This situation can also 
inadvertently and inappropriately put a regulatory thumb on the scale that 
favors one state over another when large industrial operators are 
considering locations for new industrial facilities. 
Resolving the uncertainty caused by the circuit split about 
misdemeanor liability for bird kills from industrial non-directed activities 
and the continuing question about the applicability of the MBTA to 
nonindustrial non-directed activities will require action either by the 
Supreme Court or by the Service and Congress. For the reasons discussed 
below, the latter option is preferred. 
a. Judicial Resolution 
While it is possible that the Supreme Court will someday break its 
century-long silence on the scope of misdemeanor liability under the 
MBTA by granting certiorari to hear a case on point, there are no present 
indications that the Court intends to do so, nor would any such resolution 
arise from the Court taking up the Fifth Circuit’s Citgo Petroleum 
decision.268 Shortly after the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Citgo 
Petroleum the court granted the United States an extension of time to file 
a petition for rehearing, giving the government until October 16, 2015 to 
file.269 However, no petition was submitted to the court by this date and 
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the mandate was issued on October 19, 2015.270 The United States did not 
petition the Supreme Court for a writ for certiorari following the issuance 
of the mandate, effectively ending the case. 
Even if the Supreme Court were to agree to consider such a case, 
however, it is likely that its resolution of this question would be as 
unsatisfactory as that offered by several circuit court opinions discussed 
in this article. Like them, the Supreme Court would have to contend with 
applying the skeletal language of the MBTA to contemporary industrial 
activities that bear little resemblance to those in existence in the early 
20th Century when the MBTA became law. And, like the circuit courts 
before it, the Court would have to do so in the absence of regulations that 
could provide useful guidance from the Service as to what it views as the 
appropriate role of the MBTA in regulating incidental takes of protected 
birds by industrial and nonindustrial activities. 
The most likely result of this hypothetical case would either be the 
Supreme Court adopting a Fifth Circuit-style limited reach approach that, 
outside of unpermitted takes by hunters and poachers, exempts all 
anthropogenic causes of bird mortality from criminal liability under the 
MBTA, including industrial non-directed takes; or adopting the Second 
and Tenth Circuit’s more expansive view of MBTA misdemeanor 
liability for industrial actors that nevertheless relies on artificial 
limitations of proximate cause or extra hazardous behavior to avoid the 
“absurd result” of criminalizing bird deaths resulting from everyday 
activities under the Act. Neither one of these likely results would be 
desirable. What’s more, in either scenario, the applicability of the MBTA 
to bird deaths from nonindustrial every day activities, such as driving a 
car, would not be directly at issue in the case and would therefore be 
unlikely to receive the consideration and clarification it merits. A better 
and more satisfying approach to resolving this uncertainty would come 
from Congress and the Service. 
b. Legislative and Administrative Resolution 
First, it is necessary to acknowledge that this article is being written in 
a time of congressional gridlock.271 The phrase “do nothing Congress,” 
first coined by President Truman in 1948 in reaction to the 80th 
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Congress’s extreme legislative lethargy, has been revived in recent years 
as an apt descriptor for the 114th Congress and its inability or 
unwillingness to pass legislation.272 Be that as it may, however, the best 
approach to clarify the scope of misdemeanor liability under the MBTA 
involves legislative amendments to the MBTA, coupled with an 
administrative rulemaking. So, with the hopeful observation that even the 
worst rush hour traffic jams eventually clear, this article proposes a set of 
legislative and administrative fixes to the MBTA liability quagmire. 
Some courts and commentators have argued against criminalizing 
incidental takes of migratory birds by industrial activities by pointing to 
the fact that a primary motivation for the creation of the Canada Treaty 
and the passage of the MBTA implementing it was the decimation of bird 
species such as the passenger pigeon by hunters and poachers.273 These 
commentators reason that the Act’s original focus on the directed 
activities of hunting and poaching should be treated as a jurisdictional 
limitation on the scope of the MBTA, even one hundred years after the 
law was passed when the threats to birds include industrial activities that 
the law’s drafters could not have imagined. There are several problems 
with this argument. First, it conveniently ignores the unfriendly fact that 
the extinction of the passenger pigeon and other migratory birds was 
primarily caused not by weekend hunters taking more than their fair share 
of game, but by professional hunters acting in response to the demands 
of a market that paid them handsomely for supplying that demand. In 
other words, a market hunting industry that existed to supply the millinery 
industry’s need for bird feathers to adorn women’s hats. That this 
commercially-driven, industrial-grade slaughter of birds, not the 
predations of weekend hunters, was behind the passage of the MBTA 
undermines the “originalist” argument to limit its present-day application 
to nonindustrial actors such as hunters and poachers, and supports a more 
expansive view of potential liability under the law that nevertheless 
avoids criminalizing bird deaths from everyday activities. 
A second, related problem with this argument is that it relies on the 
fact that hunters kill birds by deliberately and intentionally firing 
projectiles at them to conclude that misdemeanor liability under the 
MBTA should attach only to the small number of human endeavors 
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where the killing of protected birds is the intended result of the activity. 
In other words, so this thinking goes, as long as killing birds is not the 
intended outcome of an activity, the actor should not face liability under 
the MBTA for any bird deaths, no matter how numerous, resulting from 
it. This argument rests on a misapprehension about what Congress was 
trying to accomplish in the MBTA. The MBTA was not intended to 
simply be a piece of anti-hunting legislation. To the contrary, it expressly 
allows the continued hunting of birds within reasonable time, place, and 
manner limitations. Rather, the legislative history of the Act clearly 
shows that the drafters’ focus was on protecting migratory birds from 
current and future threats to their survival so that they could continue to 
provide aesthetic, nutritional, recreational, and agricultural benefits to 
people into the future. 
This broad conservational goal explains why the MBTA does not 
require mens rea for a criminal conviction for taking or killing a bird. 
Whether or not a person or company intended to kill a protected bird by 
their activity is not the point. The point is that a protected bird has been 
killed, which necessarily negatively impacts, even if remotely, its 
species’ continued survival. Similarly, it explains why the instrument of 
the bird’s death, be it shotgun or uncovered oil and wastewater pit, is of 
no import under the Act. Both of these manmade objects (and many 
others) are lethal to migratory birds and, therefore, both must be included 
within the ambit of the broad protections afforded to certain species of 
migratory birds by the MBTA if it is to serve its intended conservational 
purpose. But it is equally the case that there are significant societal 
benefits, be they purely recreational, purely economic, or some mixture 
of the two, that come from both; benefits few would argue should be 
entirely disregarded simply because they result in bird deaths. An 
appropriate balance must be struck that allows these activities to continue 
subject to reasonable regulations to ensure they do not threaten the 
survival of entire species of migratory birds. Most observers would agree 
that just such a balance exists under the MBTA for industrial and 
nonindustrial directed activities. While, as discussed elsewhere in this 
article, a plain reading of Section 703(a) appears to criminalize any 
activity, including hunting, that causes the death of a protected bird, 
regardless of intent, other provisions in the Act, the Service’s 
implementing regulations, and complementary state laws and regulations 
allow hunters to take protected birds within prescribed time, place, and 
manner limitations. The result is a workable and easily understood 
regulatory framework that allows this important activity to continue 
while protecting fragile bird populations from overharvesting. 
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Unfortunately, and this is the root of the problem that has led to the 
circuit split, while the MBTA also plainly criminalizes bird deaths from 
industrial non-directed activities in Section 703(a),274 neither it nor the 
statute’s implementing regulations balance this facial blanket prohibition 
with rules that exempt companies from liability under the Act for certain 
preauthorized incidental takes of birds from their industrial activities. 
That this balance was not struck in the original incarnation of the MBTA 
is not particularly surprising. Most of today’s biggest industrial threats to 
birds (wind turbines, cell towers, open-air oil and gas wastewater pits) 
either did not exist in 1918 or, if they did, their deleterious impact on 
birds was not well understood. The only industry that had Congress’s 
attention at that time was the market hunting industry, and it provided a 
balanced approach for containing its impact on migratory birds, as 
discussed above. What is surprising is that Congress has not amended the 
MBTA in the last 100 years to address this obvious deficiency, and that 
it took the Service until 2015 to begin to officially explore the possibility 
of creating an incidental take permitting scheme for industrial activities 
under the MBTA.275 This nearly century-long legislative and 
administrative silence on this critical question about the scope of the 
MBTA has persisted even as industrial development boomed in America 
and hundreds of millions of migratory birds were electrocuted, drowned, 
and smashed as a result. It is little wonder then that the court system, 
which does not have the option of staying silent when the rare MBTA 
case for an incidental take comes before it, has struggled to fill this legal 
and regulatory vacuum. The resulting uneven, confusing, and 
contradictory body of case law on MBTA incidental takes has led many 
industries to view the MBTA as a sword of Damocles hovering over their 
otherwise lawful commercial activities.276 Similarly, noncommercial 
actors—automobile drivers, cat owners, house dwellers—are not 
expressly absolved of potential liability under the MBTA for incidental 
bird kills caused by their actions, even though it is clear that these 
everyday activities are not now and have never been the intended targets 
of the Act, and must instead rely on the discretion of government lawyers 
not to bring charges against them. The time has come for Congress to step 
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in to resolve these uncertainties. To that end, Congress should take the 
following actions: 
(1) Amend Section 703(a) of the MBTA to clarify that bird deaths from 
industrial non-directed activities are strict liability misdemeanor crimes 
under the Act. Resolving the longstanding uncertainty about whether 
MBTA misdemeanor liability should attach to incidental takes of 
protected birds by industrial activities can be accomplished by adding the 
following italicized language to Section 703(a): 
(a) Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter 
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means 
or in any manner, including, without limitation, constructing, operating, 
or deconstructing industrial facilities as part of a commercial enterprise, 
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill . . . any 
migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, 
whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or 
part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . [.] 
Amending Section 703(a) to specifically include industrial non-
directed activities is consistent both with the MBTA’s overarching 
purpose to protect selected species of migratory birds from the deleterious 
impacts of human activities that threaten their survival, without regard to 
the intent behind those activities, and with the law’s creation in response 
to the industrial slaughter of birds by commercial hunters. Modern 
industrial threats to the survival of migratory birds extend well beyond 
hunting and poaching. Thus, in order to remain relevant in the 21st 
Century, the law should be amended to explicitly include these modern 
industrial activities within its ambit. 
Making this addition to Section 703 does not require any amendment 
to the current regulatory definition of “take” as pursuing, hunting, 
shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting a 
migratory bird.277 The specific injuries that industrial facilities cause to 
migratory birds, and which the MBTA was created to address, are 
adequately captured by the verbs “kill” and “wound” in the take 
definition. In other words, with the suggested amendment to Section 703, 
if a migratory bird is killed or wounded by, for example, landing in an oil 
company’s uncovered oil and wastewater pit and the company is indicted 
by the Service for taking the bird, the only question at trial should be one 
of proof that the alleged taking occurred, not whether the MBTA applies 
to incidental takes by industrial non-directed activities. 
(2) Authorize the Department of Interior to develop an MBTA 
incidental take permit system for incidental takes of migratory birds by 
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industrial non-directed activities. The suggested revision to Section 
703(a) resolves the vexing question of whether the MBTA applies to 
incidental takes by industrial activities, but it does not provide the safe 
harbor for incidental takes by industry that is currently available to 
hunters and other direct actors under the MBTA and its implementing 
regulations. The rules allowing hunters to take birds without liability as 
long as they do so in accordance with bag limits, open and close seasons, 
and other similar restrictions are compatible with the terms of the Canada, 
Mexico, Japan, and Russia Treaties and the terms of the MBTA, which 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations 
allowing for the take of migratory birds so long as they are compatible 
with the conservation purposes of the treaties.278 The Secretary, 
recognizing both the significant recreational value provided by bird 
hunting and its potential to wreak havoc on bird populations if left 
unchecked, struck a workable balance between the two with its time, 
place, and manner hunting regulations. 
A similar scheme is required for bird takes from industrial non-directed 
activities; one that balances the economic necessity for continued 
industrial development, even when that development incidentally takes 
protected birds, with reasonable regulation of those takes to ensure they 
are compatible with the conservation purposes of the MBTA and the 
treaties it implements. The Service took an initial step toward developing 
just such a scheme in May 2015 by publishing the Incidental Take 
Notice.279 Although the public comment period for the Incidental Take 
Notice closed on July 27, 2015, to date the Service has not taken further 
public action on the proposed rule. While the reasons behind this delay 
undoubtedly include both the considerable resource challenges involved 
in developing a programmatic environmental impact statement and the 
deliberate pace at which most federal rulemaking processes occurs, one 
also imagines that the current circuit split on the applicability of the 
MBTA to incidental takes of migratory birds has played a significant role 
in the Service’s apparent hesitancy in moving forward with the proposed 
rulemaking. As several public comments on the Incidental Take Notice 
pointed out,280 the Service may not have the legal authority to promulgate 
a nationwide incidental take permitting scheme for industrial non-
directed activities that take birds in light of Fifth Circuit’s holding in 
Citgo Petroleum that the MBTA does not apply to incidental takes by 
industrial actors,281 and the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Newton 
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County and Seattle Audubon,282 respectively, that criminal liability under 
the MBTA must be premised on activities directed at birds. The Service 
likely has little interest in creating an incidental take permit rule that 
cannot be implemented in nearly a third of the country. The proposed 
congressional amendment to Section 703(a) clarifying that takes of 
protected birds by industrial non-directed activities are covered by the 
MBTA would resolve this issue by providing clear statutory authority, 
and an express authorization from Congress to develop incidental take 
permit program would provide the needed lubricant to kick start the 
stalled process. 
There is relatively recent precedent for the Service developing rules 
exempting from MBTA liability certain incidental takes of birds at the 
behest of Congress, albeit for a more limited purpose. In 2002, a federal 
district court held that military live-fire training exercises by the U.S. 
Navy on the island of Farallon de Medinilla in the Pacific Ocean that 
unintentionally resulted in the death of protected birds was a violation of 
the MBTA.283 In a subsequent ruling, the same court granted plaintiff’s 
request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting such exercises on the 
island that killed migratory birds.284 Congress’s response to this decision 
was swift and decisive. Less than a year after the injunction was granted, 
Congress included a provision in the 2003 National Defense 
Authorization Act (“Authorization Act”) suspending the application of 
the MBTA to incidental takes of migratory birds by military activities for 
a period of one year to give the Secretary of the Interior sufficient time to 
prescribe regulations using its authority under Section 704(a) of the 
MBTA to exempt the military from MBTA liability for incidental takes 
of protected birds by authorized military readiness activities.285 
The Service finalized its rule exempting from MBTA liability 
incidental takes of protected birds by military readiness activities on 
March 30, 2007.286 In preparing the final rule, the Service considered 
whether allowing for the incidental take of migratory birds by military 
readiness activities would conflict with the United States’ substantive 
obligations to conserve migratory birds under any of the treaties 
implemented through the MBTA. The Service began its analysis by 
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noting that Congress made a clear determination of compatibility in the 
Authorization Act by requiring it to promulgate the incidental take 
regulations.287 It then went on to note that none of the treaties places an 
absolute prohibition on the taking or killing of migratory birds, but rather 
allow the signatory countries to authorize takings of migratory birds that 
are not inconsistent with the conservational objectives of the treaties.288 
The Service found that the final rule allowing incidental takes of 
protected birds by military activities is consistent with the objectives of 
the treaties because it is for a special purpose consistent with the purpose 
of the treaties, it is limited to a defined category of activities that can 
result in incidental takes of migratory birds, and it expressly requires the 
regulated entity to develop and implement appropriate mitigation 
measures to minimize any significant adverse impacts on migratory birds 
from the activity.289 Further, the Service noted that the rule contains a 
“safeguard” to ensure compliance with the treaties by specifying that it 
retains authority to suspend or withdraw an incidental take authorization 
if it believes that the specific activity at issue is incompatible with the 
objectives of the treaties or does not receive adequate information from 
the military to assure compliance.290 
The development of the rule allowing for incidental takes of MBTA-
protected birds by military activities based on an express congressional 
authorization provides a useful template for the proposed incidental take 
permit program for industrial non-directed activities.291 A clear legislative 
mandate to develop the incidental take permitting program, coupled with 
the suggested amendment to Section 703(a) clarifying that incidental 
takes of migratory birds from industrial non-directed activities are within 
the scope of the MBTA, is necessary to resolve the uncertainty about the 
legality and scope of such a program created by the current circuit split 
and to provide the Service with the impetus (and legislative “air cover”) 
it needs to move forward with the process it started when it published the 
Incidental Take Notice. 
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(3) Amend the MBTA to clarify that bird deaths from nonindustrial 
non-directed activities are excluded from coverage under the Act. The 
unsettled law around the MBTA also impacts nonindustrial actors who 
incidentally kill birds by, for example, hitting them with their cars, and 
must rely on the exercise of discretion by federal prosecutors lest their 
trip to the grocery store result in criminal prosecution. While certainly 
less fraught than the uneven application of MBTA liability for industrial 
non-directed activities, it is ultimately no more satisfying, relying as it 
does on case-by-case exercises of prosecutorial discretion rather than on 
an articulated rationale for excluding these nonindustrial non-directed 
activities from the MBTA’s strictures. At root, this difficulty stems from 
the failure of the MBTA’s drafters to expressly exclude these types of 
activities from the Act’s reach, despite the fact that it was apparent at the 
time that neither they nor the drafters of the Canada Treaty intended to 
criminalize them. This “original sin” has been compounded over the last 
century by the legislative failure to amend the MBTA to clarify that 
nonindustrial non-directed activities are not within the purview of the 
Act. 
One could fairly ask whether this is a case of a solution in search of a 
problem given that there is no recorded instance of the Service or 
Department of Justice prosecuting a noncommercial actor under the 
MBTA for unintentionally taking a protected bird while driving a car, 
owning a cat, living in a glassed house, or engaging in any other 
“everyday” activity. This century-long practice of declining to bring 
charges in these situations has effectively hardened the discretionary 
exercise of prosecutors into something resembling a de facto categorical 
exclusion for bird deaths incidentally resulting from nonindustrial non-
directed activities. Some courts have argued that this pattern and practice 
of declining to prosecute nonindustrial actors for incidentally taking 
migratory birds in the course of their everyday, noncommercial activities 
can be relied on to effectively ameliorate the “absurd results” that would 
flow from a literal reading of Section 703(a), which does not explicitly 
exclude incidental takes by nonindustrial non-directed activities from 
liability under the MBTA.292 However, as one commentator recently 
pointed out, this reliance on prosecutorial discretion to save an overly 
broad law actually preserves the possibility, however small it may be, of 
just such an absurd result occurring should a prosecutor decide to break 
with tradition for political or other non-substantive reasons.293 It also 
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creates the possibility for inconsistent results and the appearance of 
favoritism should enforcement actions be brought against one category 
of violators but not another, with no comprehensible rationale for the 
differing treatment.294 Further, and perhaps most practically, the Service 
and the Department of Justice simply do not have anything close to the 
resources it would require to bring prosecutions for even a percentage of 
the hundreds of millions of takes of protected birds caused by 
nonindustrial non-directed activities each year. Given this, any attempted 
enforcement in this realm would necessarily be extremely selective, 
likely piecemeal, and possibly improperly subjective. It is hard to 
conceive of a legally defensible rationale for prosecuting one driver 
whose car hits and kills a protected bird but not another.295 
Finally, by continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion and failing to 
amend the MBTA to clarify that it does not apply to nonindustrial non-
directed activities that kill birds, Congress has preserved a convenient 
stalking horse for courts that would limit the Act’s application to only 
directed activities undertaken by hunters and poachers. These courts, in a 
neat bit of rhetorical sleight of hand, use the fact that most everyone 
would agree that a person who unintentionally steps on a baby bird on 
their way to work should not be criminally prosecuted under the MBTA 
as evidence that the Act must only apply to acts directed at intentionally 
killing birds. The Fifth Circuit employed this tactic in its Citgo decision: 
If the MBTA prohibits all acts or omissions that “directly” kill birds, 
where bird deaths are “foreseeable,” then all owners of big windows, 
communication towers, wind turbines, solar energy farms, cars, cats, and 
even church steeples may be found guilty of violating the MBTA. This 
scope of strict criminal liability would enable the government to 
prosecute at will and even capriciously (but for the minimal protection of 
prosecutorial discretion) for harsh penalties: up to a $15,000 fine or six 
months’ imprisonment (or both) can be imposed for each count of bird 
“taking” or “killing.” Equally consequential and even more far-reaching 
would be the societal impact if the government began exercising its 
muscle to prevent “takings” and “killings” by regulating every activity 
that proximately causes bird deaths. The absurd results that the 
government’s interpretation would cause further bolsters our confidence 
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that Congress intended to incorporate the common-law definition of 
‘take’ in the MBTA.296 
Congress should abolish this stalking horse and eliminate the 
possibility for absurd prosecutions of cat owners, car drivers, and 
building dwellers under the MBTA by amending the MBTA to clarify 
once and for all that incidental takes of protected birds from nonindustrial 
non-directed activities do not give rise to criminal or civil liability under 
the MBTA. There is an argument to be made that doing so would violate 
the terms of the treaties implemented through the MBTA, which do not 
explicitly exclude incidental takes from everyday noncommercial 
activities from their lists of prohibited conduct. But both common sense 
and the fact that, as in the United States, there are no recorded instances 
of criminal prosecutions in Canada, Mexico, Japan, or Russia for takes of 
this kind strongly suggest that all signatory countries view the incidental 
taking of migratory birds by nonindustrial non-directed activities as 
outside the reach of the treaties. 
III. CONCLUSION 
All laws begin as creatures of their time, inexorably bound up in and 
informed by the prevailing societal, economic, and political views and 
priorities of their day. At the turn of the 20th century, many Americans 
were just beginning to recognize that the widely celebrated economic 
gains made possible by the United States’ rapid industrial expansion 
came with theretofore unacknowledged ecological losses, including the 
disappearance of a bird, the passenger pigeon, which less than twenty 
years earlier was defined by its ubiquity. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
stands as an early example of a still maturing country’s attempt to find an 
acceptable balance between the economic necessity of utilizing the 
country’s bountiful natural resources to drive industrial growth, and the 
moral imperative to protect those resources from total destruction. 
Finding this balance is no less important today than it was in 1918, and 
the MBTA still has an important role to play in preserving healthy and 
diverse populations of migratory birds for this and future generations 
without placing unnecessarily harsh restrictions on otherwise lawful 
commercial and noncommercial activities. To do so most effectively, 
however, the law must be amended to reflect the industrial, recreational, 
and social realities of the 21st century. Without these changes, the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act will continue to be a law out of time. 
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